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Chapter I - Introduction 
The Faroe Islands (hereafter referred to as the Faroes) is a small self-governing fishing nation 
situated in the North Atlantic Ocean.  It is under the sovereignty of Denmark but is not part of 
the EU.  Its economy is almost entirely dependent on its fishing and agriculture industries and, 
because of the particular movement of currents in the area, the Faroes is surrounded by some of 
the cleanest seas in the world.  This also keeps the seas at a constant temperature.  As a result, 
fish from the Faroes, particularly groundfish which do not migrate, has a distinct taste and 
texture and is particularly prized.  The Faroes also has a strong record when it comes to 
conservation, with strict laws in place including regulated fishing days, constant inspections, 
closure of specific marine areas year round or for specific periods to protect spawning areas, 
regulation of mesh sizes in nets, size of fish caught and tracking of fishing vessels.1   
In order to conserve Atlanto-Scandian herring stock (hereafter referred to as herring) in the 
North-East Atlantic, the EU, Faroes, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation have a long-
term fisheries management plan for herring (herring management plan)2, concluded under the 
auspices of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), a regional fisheries 
management organisation (RFMO) of which the five states in question are members.3  This plan 
gives effect to the parties’ obligations under Article 63 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to conserve straddling fish stocks in their waters.  Under this plan the 
members agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for herring based on recommendations of the 
International Council for the Exploration of Seas (ICES), an IGO set up to provide scientific 
advice on the sustainable use of marine ecosystems.4  The NEAFC member states meet once a 
                                                          
1 Faroe Islands ‘Sustainable Fisheries’ available at http://www.faroeislands.fo/economy-industry/fisheries/, accessed 
on 14 February 2016 (video). 
2 Pelagic AC ‘Coastal States management plan Atlanto-Scandian herring 1999’ available at http://www.pelagic-
ac.org/media/pdf/Atlanto-Scandian%20herring%201999.pdf, accessed on 7 March 2016 (Herring Management 
Plan). Also see for an example of a Recommendation adopted in terms of the Plan NEAFC ‘Recommendation 
18:2015’, available at http://www.neafc.org/system/files/Rec.18_Herring-2015.pdf, accessed on 8 August 2015. 
3 NEAFC ‘Contracting Parties’ available at http://www.neafc.org/, accessed on 23 April 2015. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 793/2013 of 20 August 2013 establishing measures in respect of the Faroe Islands to 
ensure the conservation of the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock (Implementing Regulation) Preamble 6; Kaj Leo 
Holm Johannesen ‘Government of the Faroes: Coercive economic measures are illegal and counterproductive’ 
available at http://www.government.fo/news/news/government-of-the-faroes-coercive-economic-measures-are-
illegal-and-counterproductive/, accessed on 12 June 2015. 
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year to determine how the TAC should be allocated amongst themselves for the following year.5  
In 2013, however, the Faroes set a unilateral catch far above the share allocated to it in the 2012 
consultations, in which it did not participate.6  
According to the EU, the Faroes withdrew from the 2012 consultations because it had not been 
allocated a large enough share of the TAC, but at no point had the Faroes presented a proposal or 
otherwise specified what its new share should be.7  The Faroes alleged that it had been excluded 
from the decision-making process after it requested a larger share.  It argued that it deserved a 
larger share because of the increased incidence of herring in its waters, due to altered migratory 
patterns,8 a phenomenon of global warming,9 which assertion the EU disputed.10   
In 2013 the EU banned imports of herring and Northeast Atlantic Mackerel (hereafter referred to 
as mackerel), a species that associates with herring to such an extent that it is virtually 
impossible to catch one type of fish without catching the other.11  The EU further restricted 
access to its ports, including for transhipment purposes, for Faroese vessels and vessels 
authorised by the Faroes that were engaged in the herring and mackerel fisheries or transporting 
products containing herring and mackerel.12  The EU took this action after identifying the Faroes 
as a ‘country allowing non-sustainable fishing’, alleging that the Faroes had failed to comply 
with the management measures for herring decided on by the NEAFC contracting parties.13  It 
imposed these restrictions through the promulgation of Council Regulation (EC) No. 793/2013 
(Implementing Regulation), and was authorised to do so by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1026/2012 (Shared Stocks Regulation).14  The Shared Stocks Regulation allows the EC to 
impose restrictions of this nature where third countries allow non-sustainable fishing of common 
                                                          
5 Implementing Regulation Preamble Recitals 2-7; EU-Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring: Request for 
Consultations by Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands of 7 November 2013 (WT/DS469/1) (Request for 
Consultations) para 8. 
6 Implementing Regulation Preamble 9; Request for Consultations para 9. 
7 Implementing Regulation Preamble 7-8. 
8 Johannesen (Note 4). 
9 Rosa M. Fernández Egea ‘Climate Change and the Sustainability of Fishery Resources in the North Sea: The Trade 
Dispute between the European Union and the Faroe Islands’ (2014) 4 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic 
Studies at 2. 
10 Implementing Regulation Preamble 17. 
11 Ibid Preamble 23. 
12 Ibid art 5.2. 
13 Ibid art 4. 
14 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1026/2012 of 25 October 2012 on certain measures for the purpose of the 
conservation of fish stocks in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing (Shared Stocks Regulation). 
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stocks, including straddling and highly migratory stocks, which they have a duty to conserve and 
manage through cooperation with other states.15   
In 2014 Faroese exports were divided more or less equally between EU and Non-EU countries.16  
95% of these exports were fishery products.17  In 2013 over half the Faroese catch was made up 
of herring and mackerel,18 and in 2012 70% of these fish were exported to the EU.19  This makes 
trade with the EU in herring and mackerel extremely important to the Faroes and, because of the 
Faroese economy’s dependence on fish exports, the EU trade ban particularly harmful. 
This action by the EU led the Faroes to challenge the Shared Stocks and Implementing 
Regulations (collectively “EU Regulations”), under both the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO),20 and Article 287 of UNCLOS, allowing for 
disputes to be brought in one of four international forums.21  In its request for consultations, the 
Faroes alleged that the EU Regulations contravened Articles I, V and XI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),22 setting out the most favoured nation (MFN) 
principle, freedom of transit and prohibition on quantitative restrictions respectively.,23  The 
dispute between the parties will be referred to throughout this dissertation as the herring dispute. 
A. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
Through a number of regulations, including the Shared Stocks Regulation, the EU attempts to 
prevent the phenomenon known as IUU fishing.24  IUU fishing is a growing problem.  It has 
                                                          
15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS) arts 63-64. 
16 Hagstova Føroya ‘Faroe Island in Figures 2015’ available at 
http://www.hagstova.fo/sites/default/files/Faroe_Islands_in_figures_2015.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2015 at 34. 
17 Faroe Islands ‘Trade and Industry’ available at http://www.visitfaroeislands.com/en/about-the-faroe-islands/trade-
and-industry/, accessed on 20 December 2015. 
18 Hagstova Føroya (Note 16) at 28. 
19 Svein Magnason ‘Faroese Fish Needs New Markets’ Nora Region Trends 26 July 2013 available at 
http://www.noraregiontrends.org/marineresources/marinenews/article/faroese-fish-needs-new-markets/193/neste/7/, 
accessed on 3 March 2016. 
20 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of 1994 (DSU). 
21 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), an UNCLOS Part 
VII Arbitral Tribunal or an UNCLOS Part XIII Special Arbitral Tribunal (Seabed and Area disputes). 
22 Request for Consultations para 18. 
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT) arts I, V and XI.     
24 These include Council Regulation (EU) No. 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system 
to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Regulation); Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1006/2008 of 29 September 2008 concerning authorisations for fishing activities of Community fishing 
vessels outside Community waters and the access of third country vessels to Community waters, and Council 
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been estimated to account for between 13% and 31% of catches, amounting in 2003 to a loss of 
between 5 and 11 billion US dollars worldwide.25  The overfishing caused by IUU fishing 
undermines attempts by states to manage fish stocks within sustainable limits which can lead to 
stock collapse.  IUU fishing has also been linked to drug, arms and human trafficking and forced 
labour.26  There have been several important developments in this area in the last twenty years, 
as states and international bodies, particularly the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
attempt to deal with the problem.   
One way to combat IUU fishing is through port state measures (PSMs).  According to the FAO 
these ‘typically include requirements related to prior notification of port entry, use of designated 
ports, restrictions on port entry and landing/transhipment of fish, restrictions on supplies and 
services, documentation requirements and port inspections, as well as related measures, such as 
IUU vessel listing, trade-related measures and sanctions.’27   
For many of these controls to work, there needs to be cooperation and information sharing 
between the flag state (the state on whose shipping registry a vessel is registered) and the port 
state (the state in which the ship docks either for the purpose of unloading or transhipping fish or 
to refuel and take on supplies), as well as between states cooperating to conserve common stocks 
or a common area, often through an RFMO.  An example of cooperation is the use of IUU vessel 
lists.  These include details of vessels which have engaged in IUU fishing previously and allow 
states to tailor inspections of fishing vessels accordingly.28  
The FAO has facilitated the negotiation and promulgation of a number of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law 
instruments, including its Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (‘FAO Fisheries Code’)29, 
                                                          
Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring 
compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (Control Regulation). 
25 David Agnew, John Pearce, Ganapathiraju Pramod et al Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing 
(2009). 
26Directorate-General for Internal Policies ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Sanctions in the EU’ 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/529069/IPOL_STU(2014)529069_EN.pdf, 
accessed on 12 February 2016 s2.2. 
27 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ‘Port State Measures’ available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en, 
accessed on 1 June 2015. 
28 See eg IUU Regulation art 27; North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) ‘NEAFC A and B Lists’ 
available at http://www.neafc.org/mcs/iuu, accessed on 14 February 2016; Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (NAFO), ‘Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing’ available at 
http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/fishery.html, accessed on 14 February 2016. 
29 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995 (FAO Fisheries Code). 
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International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing (‘IPOA-IUU’)30, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (‘FAO Compliance Agreement’)31, 
and Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (PSMA)32, which is not yet in force.  It also recently convened an expert 
group to create guidelines for catch documentation schemes, which attempt to trace fish products 
from capture to market through the exchange of information and issuing of certificates setting 
out catch allowances, information on the vessel, as well as the importer and exporter of the fish 
(CDS Guidelines).33  Similar certification schemes are set up by the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)34 and certain RFMOs.35   RFMOs also attempt to reduce 
IUU fishing in their areas, or of the particular species they are set up to manage, through other 
types of PSMs.36  Another important development in the area of fisheries conservation was the 
promulgation in 1995 of the the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).37  UNFSA is 
arguably an interpretation of Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS38, which set out a duty to cooperate 
in conserving straddling and highly migratory fish stocks39 – something which is often done 
through RFMOs.40  Finally, based on their obligations under these agreements, many states have, 
                                                          
30 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of 
2001 (IPOA-IUU). 
31 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas of 1993 (FAO Compliance Agreement). 
32 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing of 2009 (PSMA). 
33 FAO ‘Report of the Expert Consultation on Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS) Rome, 21−24 July 2015’ 
available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5063e.pdf, accessed on 30 January 2016 (CDS Guidelines). 
34 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora of 1973 (CITES) art VI and 
the articles mentioned therein. 
35 See eg Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, ‘Conservation Measure 10-05 
(2015): Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.’ available at https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-10-05-
2015, accessed on 6 February 2016. 
36 See eg NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement of 2010 (latest version 2016) available at 
http://www.neafc.org/scheme/2016, accessed on 14 February 2016 (NEAFC Scheme); Adriana Fabra & Virginia 
Gascόn ‘The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Ecosystem 
Approach’ (2008) 23 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 567 at 589-590. 
37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) (UNFSA).   
38 Peter-Tobias Stoll and Silja Vöneky ‘The Swordfish Case: Law of the Sea v. Trade’ (2002) Max-Planck-Institut 
für ausländisches öffentliches Rechet und Völkerrecht 21 at 25. 
39 UNCLOS arts 63 and 64. 
40 For example the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) seeks to conserve 
tuna stocks which are highly migratory and is often targeted in IUU fishing operations and NEAFC seeks to 
conserve Atlantic herring which is a straddling fish stock. 
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like the EU, promulgated domestic legislation to prevent IUU fish entering their markets.41  
These are important instruments in light of the failure of ‘flags of convenience’ states to 
effectively police IUU fishing by vessels on their registries.42 
A good example of domestic PSMs are found in various regulations promulgated by the EU to 
combat IUU fishing, including the Shared Stocks Regulation.   
Council Regulation (EU) No. 1005/2008 (IUU Regulation) is a broad instrument which includes 
many different types of PSMs.  The IUU Regulation, like many instruments dealing with IUU 
fishing,43 takes its definition of IUU fishing from IPOA-IUU.44  This provides, in relevant part, 
that illegal fishing includes: 
activities conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant 
regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the 
conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the 
States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law.45  
The definition of unregulated fishing provides in relevant part that unregulated fishing: 
refers to fishing activities in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no 
applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities are 
conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of 
living marine resources under international law.46 
The Shared Stocks Regulation, under which the measures were imposed on the Faroes, deals 
specifically with these aspects of IUU fishing.  It further provides that measures set out in the 
IUU Regulation should be taken into account in applying the Shared Stocks Regulation in order 
to ensure that action taken to conserve EU fish stocks ‘is effective and coherent’.47  This defines 
                                                          
41 See eg IUU Regulation; Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act H.R. 774 of 2015 (US IUU 
legislation); FAO ‘International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing’ available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/npoa/en, accessed on 15 February 2016. 
42 Agnew, Pearce & Pramod (Note 25). 
43 See eg PSMA art 1(e); US IUU legislation s303(2); NEAFC Scheme art 1(l). 
44 IPOA-IUU s3; IUU Regulation art 2.2 
45 IPOA-IUU s3.1.2. 
46 Ibid s3.3.2. 
47 Shared Stocks Regulation Preamble 7. 
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the distinct competences of the two regulations and ensures there is no overlap in the 
enforcement of the EU’s policy to conserve fish stocks through PSMs.   
Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 (Control Regulation) sets out a comprehensive set of 
control and monitoring mechanisms to allow EU States to comply with the EU’s common 
fisheries policy.  Although the Control Regulation does not focus specifically on PSMs, it does 
provide for measures which fall into this category.48   
B. Port state measures and international trade law 
It is clear from the FAO’s definition of PSMs for IUU fishing that trade measures are an 
important way to prevent IUU fishing.  Indeed, the purpose of PSMs is to prevent IUU fish from 
getting into a country, either to be sold in that country, or to be transported through that country 
for sale elsewhere.  This deters IUU fishing by reducing the number of ‘ports of convenience’ 
that such fish can be brought into, which is one of the means available to states to combat IUU 
fishing.49  As fish perishes rapidly, the closure of all ports in a particular area is the best way to 
prevent IUU fishing in that area.  However, as shown in the herring dispute, use of trade 
measures in this manner may very well contravene the laws of the WTO, particularly those in the 
GATT and, possibly, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)50.   
The fact that the herring dispute was referred to both the WTO and UNCLOS indicates the close 
relationship between trade and fisheries law, and illustrates the potential for a clash of trade 
agreements and environmental agreements in the international sphere.  This is an issue which has 
led to a number of cases being brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and its 
GATT predecessor in the context of fishing.51  Indeed, the herring dispute was not the first time a 
                                                          
48 Control Regulation - see eg Title IV, chap I, art 19 and chap III, art 43. 
49 Others include capacity reduction (cutting subsidies and/or re-training fishermen) – see Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies (Note 26) at 27; Margaret A. Young ‘Trade-Related Measures to Address Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing’ (2015) E15 Expert Group on Oceans, Fisheries and the Trade System at 7, and consumer 
information initiatives such as ecolabelling – for a good exposition of the features these initiatives need to succeed 
see Trevor J. Ward ‘Measuring the Success of Seafood Ecolabelling’ in Trevor Ward and Bruce Phillips (eds) 
Seafood Ecolabelling: Principle and Practice (2009).  
50 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of 1994 (TBT). 
51 US-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (L/5198-29S/91) Report of the Panel adopted 
on 22 February 1982 (US-Canada Tuna); Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon (L/6268-35S/98) Report of the Panel adopted on 22 March 1988 (Canada-Herring and Salmon); Chile-
Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish: Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities of 26 April 2000 (WT/DS193/1 G/L/367) (Chile-Swordfish). 
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complaint had been lodged at the WTO alleging that domestic PSMs put in place for the purpose 
of conserving fish contravened provisions of the GATT.  In Chile-Swordfish, which was also 
referred to both the WTO and an UNCLOS body, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS),52 Chile alleged that various Spanish fishermen had made catches on the high seas 
bordering Chile’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in contravention of conservation rules 
contained in Chile’s national fisheries law.53  Interestingly, the EU was the WTO complainant in 
that case, which was brought in 2000, before the IUU Regulation and EU Regulations came into 
effect. 
Both Chile-Swordfish and the herring dispute were settled before the tribunals could pronounce 
on the merits of the issue.54  This is unfortunate from an international law standpoint as there is 
no guidance on a number of important questions raised by these cases, particularly around the 
relationship between WTO law and the various IUU fishing laws that have been negotiated 
internationally and in RFMOs, and whether there is any chance of a procedural conflict between 
a WTO Panel or Appellate Body (hereafter referred to as a DSB body) and the UNCLOS 
Tribunals where both are seized with the same matter.   
This dissertation will use the facts of the herring dispute to shed light on the question of whether 
PSMs imposed on state partners in an RMFO for IUU fishing are compatible with international 
trade law.  In light of the increasing standardisation of IUU fishing measures through instruments 
such as the CDS Guidelines and PSMA, an analysis of the EU Regulations may also be directly 
applicable to an analysis of legislation of other states.  The US, for example, has promulgated 
measures to incorporate the PSMA into its domestic law55 and a number of countries have 
notified to the FAO plans of action to prevent IUU fishing.56   
                                                          
52 ITLOS ‘Case No.7’, available at https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-7/, accessed on 8 August 2015.   
53 Chile-Swordfish (Note 51); Stoll & Vöneky (Note 38) at 21. 
54 World Trade Organization (WTO) ‘Chile — Measures affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfish’ available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm, accessed on 8 August 2015; ITLOS Order 
2009/1, available at https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_7/Ord.2009.1-16.12.09.E.pdf, 
accessed on 8 August 2015; WTO ‘European Union — Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring’, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds469_e.htm, accessed on 8 August 2015; Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration (The Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the Faroe 
Islands v. The European Union), available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/25, accessed on 8 August 2015 
(Atlanto-Scandian Herring PCA). 
55 US IUU legislation Title III.  
56 FAO (Note 41). 
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Chapters II and III of the dissertation consider the consistency of the EU Regulations with the 
GATT.  Chapter II finds that the EU Regulations contravene one or more of Articles I, V and XI 
of the GATT (the substantive provisions).  Chapter III considers whether these measures, having 
contravened one of the GATT substantive provisions, may be justified under Article XX of the 
GATT (the exceptions provision).  Chapter III concludes that, although well-crafted, the EU 
Regulations may still not be justifiable under the Article XX Chapeau in the particular 
circumstances of the herring dispute, based on principles in previous WTO cases.  Chapter IV 
considers the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) relevant to 
IUU fishing and WTO agreements, to determine whether the EU Regulations could be 
considered GATT-consistent by reference to these MEAs or whether the MEAs could override 
WTO law.57  Chapter V concludes. 
 
  
                                                          
57 The referral of the herring dispute to both the WTO and UNCLOS also raises issues of jurisdictional conflict.  An 
analysis of jurisdictional conflict is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  However, it should be noted that it is 
unlikely that either the WTO or UNCLOS could have claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the herring dispute – in 
this regard see Stoll & Vöneky (Note 38) at 26-27 and Karin Oellers-Frahm ‘Multiplication of International Courts 
and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction – Problems and Possible Solutions’ in Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 5 (2001) at 86-88. 
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Chapter II – GATT and the TBT 
The Shared Stocks Regulation allows the EU to declare a country one which allows non-
sustainable fishing (NSF country),58 and to impose quantitative restrictions on imports of fish 
caught under its control.  These restrictions extend to imports of fishery products made of or 
containing such fish, including fishery products made by other countries.59  The Shared Stocks 
Regulation envisions that the idea of ‘control’ will be decided on a case-by-case basis,60 and the 
Implementing Regulation provides that herring and mackerel caught under the control of the 
Faroes is that caught by vessels flying the Faroese flag or those vessels flying the flag of other 
states that are authorised to fish in the Faroes EEZ, or chartered by a Faroese firm or 
authorities.61  The Shared Stocks Regulation further allows the EU to prohibit exports of fishing 
vessels flying the flag of EU states to the NSF country,62 impose restrictions on the use of EU 
ports for vessels flying the flag of the NSF country that fish the common stock or associated 
species as well as those transporting such fish, whether flying the flag of the NSF country or 
not.63  Private trade arrangements between EU ‘economic operators’ and the NSF country to 
allow an EU-flagged vessel to ‘use fishing opportunities’ of the NSF country, are also 
prohibited,64 and there are a number of other measures, such as prohibitions on re-flagging of 
vessels (registering the vessel on a different shipping register),65 which are designed to prevent 
evasion of these restrictions.66   
On this basis the Implementing Regulation was adopted, leading the Faroes to allege that the EU 
had breached Articles I, V and XI of the GATT. 
A. Article I 
GATT Article I provides for MFN treatment.  ‘(A)ny advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country’ 
                                                          
58 Shared Stocks Regulation art 4.1(a). 
59 Ibid art 4.1(c). 
60 Ibid art 4.1(d). 
61 Implementing Regulation art 3(d). 
62 Shared Stocks Regulation art 4.1(i). 
63 Ibid art 4.1(e). 
64 Ibid art 4.1(j). 
65 Ibid art 4.1(g). 
66 Ibid – see eg arts 4.1(h) (chartering agreements) and 4.1(k) (joint fishing operations). 
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must be ‘accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other contracting parties’ in respect of, inter alia, ‘all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and exportation’.67   
Article I thus requires that products be like before there can be any discriminatory trade effect 
from favouring another trading partner – in this case the question is whether herring fished 
unsustainably is ‘like’ herring fished sustainably.  DSB bodies consider products to be like when 
they have similar physical characteristics and end uses, when consumers are likely to consider 
the products interchangeable, and when they have the same or similar classifications under 
Member’s tariff schedules.68  Generally the issue of tariff classification is used to bolster a 
finding made using the other three factors, and the less precise the product description in the 
schedule, the less relevant the tariff classification is.69   
Consumer tastes and preferences is often given a lot of weight in the analysis.  In EC-Asbestos 
the AB, in reversing the Panel’s findings that the cement-based products containing asbestos 
fibres were not like those containing non-carcinogenic fibres, found that ‘a determination on the 
"likeness" of the cement-based products cannot be made…in the absence of an examination of 
evidence on consumers' tastes and habits.’70  However, this finding was made under Article III of 
the GATT.  Although Article III also requires a like product analysis, it is generally more 
focused on economic and competitive forces than Article I, as its purpose is to ensure that 
domestic and imported like products are not treated differently once imported products enter a 
country.71  Article I analyses are often based more on physical characteristics, in 
acknowledgment of the fact that WTO Members are still able to discriminate in a curtailed 
                                                          
67 GATT art I(1). 
68 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R) Report of the 
Appellate Body adopted on 1 November 1996 (Japan-Alcohol AB) at 20-22; EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products (WT/DS135/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body adopted on 5 April 2001 (EC-
Asbestos AB) at 39, amongst many others. 
69 Japan-Alcohol AB at 22. 
70 EC-Asbestos AB para 145. 
71 Japan-Alcohol AB at 21; Robert E. Hudec ‘“Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and 
III’ in Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis (eds) Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in 
World Trade (2000).   
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fashion using tariffs.72  Indeed, tarification (requiring countries to change quantitative restrictions 
to equivalent tariffs) was an important issue in previous negotiating Rounds at the WTO.73 
Herring caught in Faroese waters may be physically different from that caught in the waters of 
other NEAFC parties like Norway or Iceland, because of the unique ocean conditions prevailing 
in the Faroes.  However, this appears to apply more to groundfish species like haddock and cod 
which do not migrate.  As the seas are a constant temperature around the Faroes, fish which do 
not migrate are exposed to one temperature for the duration of their lives.  This gives them a 
particular texture.74  Herring, which do migrate, do not consistently remain in one temperature.  
Fish from the Faroes also has a particular taste because of the diversity of food sources in the 
seas surrounding the Faroes, and is seen to be of high quality by those countries that trade with 
the Faroes, such as Spain.75  This particular characteristic of Faroese fish would also seem to 
apply to herring caught in the Faroes, and may be a basis for differentiating Faroese herring from 
herring exported from other NEAFC countries.   
These physical differences could also have an impact on consumer tastes and preferences and 
possibly even end uses.  If Faroese fish is prized for its taste it may be sold fresh to eat, while 
other herring may be used in fisheries products.  Conversely, consumers may not wish to eat fish 
caught unsustainably, although this would depend on whether there was an appropriate 
ecolabelling scheme in place to differentiate these products, as in the case of dolphin-friendly 
tuna.  A full analysis is impossible without the benefit of empirical research on consumer 
preference.  The OECD High Seas Taskforce also points out that it is unclear whether consumer 
demand for sustainable fish products in developed countries is driving corporate interest in these 
products (such as campaigns initiated by Whole Foods Markets in the US and J Sainsbury in the 
UK) or whether it is the other way around.76   
                                                          
72 Hudec (ibid).   
73 Particularly the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds. 
74 Faroe Islands (Note 1).  
75 Ibid. 
76 High Seas Task Force (2006) (Governments of Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth Institute at Columbia University) ‘Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on 
the high seas’ (2006) at 33. 
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It should also be noted that the EU does not differentiate Faroese herring from other herring in its 
tariff schedules, and nor do other countries.77  Although tariff classification will generally not be 
the deciding factor in a like product analysis, it may carry more weight in an Article I than an 
Article III analysis, as the former deals specifically with tariffs.  
A like product analysis therefore does not give a clear answer as to whether these products would 
be considered like under Article I of the GATT.  If they are like, there would have been a 
violation of Article I in the herring dispute as the EU Regulations put Faroese imports at a 
disadvantage compared to like imports from other NEAFC countries.  However, the argument 
could also be made that Faroese fish and fish of other NEAFC countries is not like, based on the 
physical characteristics of the herring, and the impact of this on consumer preferences and 
possibly end uses. 
B. Article V 
Article V of the GATT provides for freedom of transit for WTO Members through the territory 
of other Members.  Under Article V:2 ‘(n)o distinction shall be made which is based on the flag 
of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances 
relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.’78  
For these purposes, goods are also deemed to be in transit when they are being transported across 
a state to a destination outside that state (traffic in transit).79  A WTO Member is required to give 
freedom of transit to all goods of another Member, including traffic in transit, which must be 
extended to all Members on an MFN basis.80   
Article V:2 does not appear to require a like product analysis.  Article V refers to like products 
only in Ad Article V:5, which deals with transportation charges.  In Colombia-Ports of Entry the 
Panel held that no like product analysis was necessary for Article V:6.  Article V:6 provides that 
no less favourable treatment should be accorded to goods which have been in transit through the 
territory of another Member than that accorded to goods which have been transported directly 
                                                          
77 WTO ‘Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm, accessed on 8 March 2016. 
78 GATT art V:2. 
79 Ibid art V:1; Colombia-Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (WT/DS366/R), Report of the Panel 
adopted on 20 May 2009 (Colombia-Ports of Entry Panel) para 7.397. 
80 Colombia-Ports of Entry Panel para 7.401. 
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from their place of origin.  The comparison under this Article was, therefore, between any type 
of good shipped from its place of origin and any good that has been in transit through another 
country, rather than between different types of goods.81  The same is true of Article V:2 which 
prohibits distinguishing between goods on the basis of their flag, port of origin, ownership and 
other bases unrelated to characteristics of the good itself.  Certainly the Colombia-Ports of Entry 
Panel did not conduct a like product analysis in coming to its conclusion that Colombia’s 
measures were inconsistent with Article V:2.82 
The ban on imports of herring and mackerel imposed by the Implementing Regulation included a 
ban on transhipment of these fish and fishery products within EU Ports,83 as well as the general 
ban on entry into EU ports.  The Shared Stocks Regulation defines ‘transhipment’ as ‘the 
unloading of all or any fish or fishery products on board a fishing vessel to another vessel.’84  
Although this does not necessarily mean that the goods will then be taken to a place outside of 
the EU, the purpose of transhipment is to take goods to a place other than where they are 
transhipped, which may be outside the EU.  Fisheries products may also be unloaded in EU ports 
for the purpose of being transported overland to a destination outside the EU.  Thus, at least 
some of the banned products would, but for the ban, be in transit through the EU rather than 
having the EU as their final destination.   
The EU Regulations therefore discriminated on the basis of origin and the flag of the vessel for 
the purposes of Article V:2 by refusing to allow vessels flying the flag of the Faroes or 
transporting its fish and fishery products access to EU ports for transhipment purposes, or to 
unload the vessel and transport goods through the EU to another destination.   
C. Article XI 
Article XI(1) of the GATT provides for a general prohibition on quantitative trade restrictions, 
including import bans and quotas.  A total import ban would appear to be in contravention of 
                                                          
81 Ibid para 7.477. 
82 Ibid paras 7.404-7.431. 
83 Implementing Regulation art 5(1). 
84 Shared Stocks Regulation art 2(e). 
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Article XI(1) based on past WTO jurisprudence in cases such as Brazil-Tyres85 and US-Tuna I 
and II.86   
There is, however, some debate about whether this article is still applicable in cases similar to the 
US-Tuna cases. 87  Both US-Tuna I and II dealt with a US measure restricting imports of tuna 
which had been harvested using purse-seine fishing methods which involved setting on dolphins 
(surrounding schools of dolphins to catch tuna swimming below), a fishing technique used by the 
majority of the Mexican tuna fishing fleet.   
In US-Tuna I the US argued that its measures should be analysed under Article III of the GATT, 
rather than Article XI.  Article III provides for domestic and imported goods to be given equal 
treatment once they enter a domestic market.  Ad Article III extends this requirement of equality 
to the situation where a product is imported into a state and a law applicable to both domestic 
and imported goods is imposed on the imported goods at the border.  Because of Ad Article III 
the US argued that its measures should be analysed on the basis of Article III and not Article XI, 
as an enforcement of an internal measure at the point of importation, rather than an import ban 
on foreign goods.  As the US applied similar, and in fact slightly more onerous, dolphin 
conservation measures to its own fishing vessels, there was no discrimination in applying import 
restrictions based on whether the tuna to be imported into the US was caught in a dolphin-
friendly manner. 88  The Panel found, however, that Article III could not apply in this manner 
where products can be distinguished only by virtue of their process and production methods 
(PPMs), rather than by product characteristics,89 and reiterated this finding in US-Tuna II.90  
PPMs refer to the manner in which a product is made or harvested.  In US-Tuna I and II the tuna 
was physically identical but the US sought to differentiate Mexican tuna because of the way that 
it was harvested.   
                                                          
85 Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (WT/DS332/R) Report of the Panel adopted on 17 
December 2007 para 7.34.  This was an effective import ban brought about through the refusal to issue import 
licenses.   
86 US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS21/R) unadopted Report of the Panel of 3 September 1991 (US-Tuna I) 
para 5.18; US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (DS29/R) unadopted Report of the Panel of 16 June 1994 (US-Tuna 
II) para 5.10. 
87 Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason The Regulation of International Trade (2013) at 681. 
88 US-Tuna I para 5.10. 
89 Ibid paras 5.14-5.15.  
90 US-Tuna II para 5.8. 
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Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason argue that in the wake of the US-Shrimp and EC-Asbestos 
decisions, the product-process distinction drawn in US-Tuna I and II, which despite being 
dubious even at the time it was handed down was adopted by WTO Members as law, may have 
fallen away.91  In US-Shrimp US legislation conditioned access to the US shrimp market on the 
use by countries of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) on shrimp vessels, which allow turtles to 
escape from shrimp nets.92  In deciding the case, the AB stated that if WTO Members were not 
allowed to pass domestic measures conditioning access to its markets which required other 
countries to change their internal policies,93 most of Article XX of the GATT would be rendered 
inutile.94  Article XX allows certain measures even if they violate substantive GATT provisions, 
and is discussed in Chapter III below.  According to Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason, the 
pronouncement of the AB that Article III would be rendered inutile suggests that measures based 
on process, rather than policy, such as a measure which requires all shrimp to be caught in a way 
which does not harm turtles, would not violate Article III at all.  This is because, if it did violate 
Article III, it would need to be justified under Article XX.  Article XX would therefore have a 
purpose and not be ‘rendered inutile’ by its inability to justify measures aimed at changing other 
country’s policies.95  The authors also point to the case of EC-Asbestos as providing further 
evidence that process-based measures which are non-discriminatory do not violate Article III.  
The AB in EC-Asbestos found that there are two parts to an Article III analysis – whether the 
domestic and imported products are like products and, if they are, whether imported products 
receive less favourable treatment than like products.  Thus, even when products are considered 
so closely competitive that they are like (as mentioned above Article III focuses on the 
competitive relationship between products) they may still be distinguished in domestic 
legislation, provided imported products are not treated less favourably.96  In this regard the AB 
                                                          
91 Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason (Note 87) at 681. 
92 US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body 
adopted on 6 November 1998 (US-Shrimp AB). 
93 The Panel in US-Tuna II found that the US measures could not be justified under GATT Article XX(b) or (g) – 
discussed in Chapter III(A) below – because the measures required countries like Mexico to put in policies to reduce 
dolphin mortality in tuna fishing – US-Tuna II para 5.27. 
94 US-Shrimp AB para 121. 
95 Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason (Note 87) at 681. 
96 Ibid at 158 and 681. 
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has noted in cases like Korea-Beef97 and Dominican Republic-Cigarettes98 that different 
treatment is not necessarily unequal treatment.  Provided that equally restrictive regulations are 
imposed on domestic products and imported products therefore, there is no violation of Article 
III.    
The explicit recognition of PPMs as a basis on which to differentiate goods in the TBT99 appears 
to be further recognition of the falling away of this distinction, if it ever existed.  Although there 
may be a product-process distinction drawn in an application of other provisions in the TBT, the 
Panel in US-Tuna III, regarding access to a US label for dolphin-safe tuna, remarked that 
consumer preferences based on the dolphin-safe status of products might be relevant to an 
assessment of likeness under Article 2.1 of the TBT100, using the same criteria as those relevant 
in a GATT Article III analysis.101  This suggests that, where products are not like because they 
have different PPMs, there would be no discriminatory effect in differentiating between such 
products. 
The EU Regulations do not deal with fish caught by EU state vessels.  However, the IUU and 
Control Regulations do deal with this, subjecting EU state vessels to catch restrictions, 
suspension or cancelling of financial assistance, closed fisheries and reduction of catch quotas to 
EU states where there has not been compliance with conservation and management methods and 
overfishing.102  EU state vessels are not denied access to their home ports if they exceed catch 
restrictions.103  However, the IUU Regulation does provide for sanctioning of nationals and EU 
state vessels for IUU fishing, including seizing catches and fishing gear,104 not allowing access to 
EU ports apart from the vessel’s home port,105 suspension or withdrawal of fishing rights,106 and, 
                                                          
97 Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (WT/DS161/AB/R; WT/DS169/AB/R) 
Report of the Appellate Body adopted on 10 January 2001 para 137. 
98 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (WT/DS302/AB/R) 
Report of the Appellate Body adopted on 19 May 2005 para 96. 
99 TBT Annex 1(1). 
100 US-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (WT/DS381/R) 
Report of the Panel, as modified by the Appellate Body Report adopted on 13 June 2012 (US-Tuna III Panel) para 
7.249. 
101 Ibid paras 7.224-7.225. 
102 Control Regulation Title XI. 
103 IUU Regulation art 37(5). 
104 Ibid art 43(e). 
105 Ibid art 37(5). 
106 Ibid art 45(4). 
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in serious cases, administrative and criminal sanctions.107  These are harsh penalties and in 
certain cases (e.g. refusal of access to ports) directly comparable to those applied to an NSF 
country.108  EU nationals in violation of the IUU Regulation may, therefore, be deprived of their 
fishing rights and livelihood, just as a trade ban will deprive nationals of third party countries of 
their livelihood.  If the product-process distinction really has fallen away therefore, the EU 
Regulations may be considered non-discriminatory under Article III of the GATT, rather than a 
violation of Article XI of the GATT.  
Given that no DSB body has explicitly stated that the US-Tuna cases were wrongly decided, it is 
not clear whether a Panel or the AB would, in future, decide this sort of question under Article 
III or Article XI of the GATT.  This would depend largely on the issues.  In US-Tuna III the 
Panel ultimately decided that the products were like, because to decide otherwise would be to 
pre-empt the question it was faced with – namely whether Mexican tuna qualified for a dolphin-
safe label or not.109  If the matter had gone to a Panel in the herring dispute and it was found that 
Article III did not apply, the Panel would likely have found that the EU Regulations violated 
Article XI, on the basis of past jurisprudence.110  Although there are a limited number of 
exceptions in GATT Article XI:2, none of these are applicable in the herring dispute.  In the 
herring dispute the contravention of Article XI:1 may also very well have been conceded by the 
EU had the matter come before a Panel, as this has been done in the past.111   
D. TBT Agreement 
Measures such as the EU Regulations potentially contravene the TBT if they can be considered 
technical regulations.  A technical regulation is defined in Annex 1.1 of the TBT as a 
‘(d)ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory.’  
                                                          
107 Ibid art 44. 
108 Ibid arts 39-47. 
109 US-Tuna III Panel para 7.250.  
110 See Notes 85 and 86 above. 
111 See eg India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (WT/DS90/R) 
Report of the Panel adopted on 22 September 1999 para 5.123.  See also US-Tuna II para 5.7 where the US did not 
put forward any evidence to refute the XI:1 violation. 
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In EC-Seals the AB found that regulations prohibiting trade in seal products and products 
containing seals, with an exception for subsistence but not commercial sealing by indigenous 
communities (the IC exception), were not technical regulations.112  According to the AB, the 
existence of the IC exception meant that the trade restrictions imposed by the regulations relied 
not only on the fact that the products contained seal but also on the identity of the hunter and 
nature of the hunt, which are not product characteristics.113  The fact that seal was an input in 
these products was, therefore, not enough to bring the products within the import ban – they also 
had to be hunted in a particular manner (i.e. commercially).  However, the AB declined to 
conduct a similar analysis with regard to whether the regulations laid down related PPMs.  This 
was because of due process concerns, as the issue of PPMs had not been argued at Panel stage 
and the Panel had not made any findings in this regard.114   
As noted by Bhala, Gantz and Keating et al, the EC-Seals case appears to be ‘results-oriented 
jurisprudence’ in that its interpretation was geared at a particular outcome (narrowing the ambit 
of the TBT agreement).  According to the authors, the AB emphasised the importance of the 
various exceptions as integral parts of the Seal Regime to avoid over-inclusion of Member’s 
legislative measures under the TBT, which is more onerous to comply with than the GATT.115  
The AB similarly interpreted Article 2.1 of the TBT to render the TBT less stringent in Clove-
Cigarettes,116 reading in a requirement that a measure may be considered discriminatory 
provided it stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction, such as protection of the 
environment or animal life and health.  Prior to this, if a measure was discriminatory it was 
irrelevant if it was taken for one of these purposes, unlike in the GATT, where measures may be 
justified by reference to such purposes under Article XX.  The AB’s careful interpretation of the 
TBT in these cases is possibly in response to criticism by commentators such as Trebilcock, 
                                                          
112 EC-Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, (WT/DS400/AB/R; 
WT/DS401/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body adopted on 18 June 2014 (EC-Seals AB) para 5.59. 
113 Ibid para 5.45. 
114 Ibid para 5.69 
115 Raj Bhala, David A Gantz, Shannon B Keating et al ‘WTO Case Review 2014’ (2015) 32 Arizona Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 2 at 515.   
116 US–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (WT/DS406/AB/R), Report of the Appellate 
Body adopted on 24 April 2012 (US-Clove Cigarettes AB) paras 174-175. 
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Howse and Eliason, who noted that unless the TBT was interpreted ‘with great caution and 
sensitivity’ it ran the risk of being overly intrusive on domestic regulatory choices.117    
The EU Regulations banning the import of products containing herring and mackerel caught by 
Faroese vessels similarly does not restrict all imports of herring and mackerel, but only those 
caught by Faroese fishers, or those fishers operating under the control of the Faroes.  The fact 
that herring and mackerel are in the product is, therefore, not a sufficient condition to prevent 
their import into the EU.  The fish must also have been caught by a defined class of fishers.  
Thus, on the strength of the findings in EC-Seals, the EU Regulations do not fall under the first 
part of the definition of a technical regulation in the TBT as they do not differentiate between 
herring mackerel only on the basis of product characteristics.  Drawing on the analysis of Bhala, 
Gantz and Keating et al it is also probable that the AB will interpret the second part of the 
technical regulation definition cautiously to avoid every measure aimed at preventing some sort 
of undesirable conduct, such as environmental degradation, being challenged under the TBT.  It 
therefore appears that the EU Regulations do not fall under the TBT, a conclusion which is 





                                                          
117 Trebilcock, Howse & Eliason (Note 87) at 316. 
118 Request for Consultations. 
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Chapter III – Article XX Exceptions 
Article XX of the GATT provides a list of exceptions which may be used to justify measures 
which are inconsistent with substantive provisions of the GATT.  Those exceptions which have 
been successfully invoked to justify environmental measures are Articles XX(a) (measures 
necessary to protect public morals), XX(b) (measures necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health) and XX(g) (measures related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.  After deciding that a measure is provisionally justified under one of these provisions, 
the measure must then be tested against the Article XX Chapeau (hereafter referred to as the 
Chapeau) to determine whether it is applied in a manner which constitutes arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.119  
A. Provisional Justification 
(i) Article XX(a) 
Article XX(a) was successfully invoked in EC-Seals (AB Report) to justify measures banning 
the import of seal products into the EU because of the inhumane methods employed to kill 
seals.120  Certain findings of the Panel Report were reversed by the AB in its decision.  However, 
aspects of the Panel Report, such as its evaluation of what constituted public morals in the 
circumstances of the case, remain relevant to the interpretation of Article XX(a). 
In EC-Seals the public morals at issue were those of the EU public.121  The public morals test 
takes into account the preferences of consumers.  It does not consider economic factors, as with 
Article III, but rather the ‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
community or nation’122 which can ‘vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, 
                                                          
119 See US-Shrimp AB paras 118-122, where the AB criticised the Panel for reversing the steps in the Article XX 
test and considering the Chapeau first. 
120 EC-Seals AB para 5.290. 
121 EC–Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (WT/DS400/R; WT/DS401/R) 
Report of the Panel, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted on 18 June 2014 (EC-Seals Panel) para 
7.409. 
122 US-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the Panel adopted 
on 20 April 2005 para 4.465.  
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including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values’.123  A WTO Member is not 
required to show that public morals are actually at risk to invoke the exception, or to identify the 
exact content of the public morals at issue.124  A Member may also decide that different levels of 
protection are appropriate in similar situations (for example seal hunting and deer hunting).125   
The Panel, in evaluating what constituted the public morals of the EU, considered the measures 
themselves and the drafting history of the seal regulations.  It based its assessment primarily on 
the fact that these documents referred to strong public feelings about the manner in which seals 
are killed and the pain and suffering they experience.126  It also noted that a number of EU 
countries and the EU itself had passed measures that aimed to protect animal welfare, 
demonstrating the importance of the issue to the EU.127  These provisions of the Panel Report 
suggest that it is necessary to show that a measure is in fact taken for reasons of public morality 
in order to fall under Article XX(a), as demonstrated in the measure itself and surrounding 
circumstances.   
The issue of IUU fishing of herring and mackerel does not provoke the same emotional response 
as the killing of seals, especially given the inhumane methods of killing to which seals are 
subjected.128  It is also likely that the issue is not as well known to the EU public as something 
like dolphin mortality in the killing of tuna, as this is often the subject of eco-labels.  In addition, 
the introductory language of all the EU Regulations shows clearly that their purpose is to comply 
with the EU’s international obligations, as well as to manage and conserve fish stocks,129 rather 
than protect public morals.  It is, therefore, highly unlikely that a Panel would have found Article 
XX(a) to be applicable in the herring dispute.  
 
  
                                                          
123 Ibid para 4.461 – these findings were made in the context of Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services of 1994 (GATS) and approved in EC-Seals Panel para 7.380 for the purposes of Article XX(b) of the 
GATT. 
124 EC-Seals AB paras 5.198-5.199. 
125 Ibid para 5.200. 
126 EC-Seals Panel paras 7.386-7.398. 
127 Ibid paras 7.405-7.408. 
128 Ibid - the Panel noted at para 7.222 that it may not be possible to plan to kill a seal humanely because of the 
circumstances of the hunt. 
129 Shared Stocks Regulation Preamble; Implementing Regulation Preamble. 
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(ii) Article XX(b) 
Whether a measure protects human, animal or plant life or health has never been a particularly 
contentious issue and the DSB bodies have recognised that the protection of humans from cancer 
caused by asbestos fibres,130 protection of humans and animals from diseases and smoke 
inhalation caused by tyre fires and the breeding of mosquitoes in used tyres,131 protection of 
dolphins132 and restrictions on cigarettes133 may all fall under this exception.  It is possible that 
the EU could have argued that the EU Regulations aim to protect herring and are therefore 
justified under XX(b).  However, the EU Regulations are not specifically aimed at protecting the 
life of herring, but rather at managing the herring stock to preserve it as a future resource.  
Indeed, those pre-WTO cases dealing with measures put in place to conserve management of 
tuna and herring stocks were decided under Article XX(g), rather than XX(b).  The 
Implementing Regulation, in examining the consistency of its own measures with international 
law, also refers specifically to the fact that the measures imposed on the Faroes relate to an 
exhaustible natural resource.  This suggests that the Article XX(g) is the more appropriate 
exception to raise in these circumstances.  However, the EU Regulations do, arguably, also seek 
to preserve the lives of herring, and the possibility of an argument under Article XX(b) cannot be 
discounted as a possible defence to the GATT violations discussed. 
Under the second aspect of the Article XX(b) analysis, the question is whether the EU 
Regulations would be considered necessary to protect Atlantic herring.  Factors relevant to 
determining necessity include the importance of the interests at stake, the contribution to the 
fulfilment of the objective at issue, the trade restrictiveness of the measure and whether there are 
reasonable less trade-restrictive alternatives that achieve the WTO Member’s desired level of 
protection, to which a DSB body will defer.134  These factors must be weighed holistically.135   
In the herring dispute the important interest at stake would have been the prevention of IUU 
fishing and therefore the conservation of the fish stocks, the prevention of the collapse of an 
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important fish stock with its implications for both food security and ecological diversity 
associated with IUU fishing.  Many of these are seen as important values by WTO Members.136  
This would have to be balanced against the highly trade-restrictive nature of the total import ban.  
The EU’s desired level of protection, as reflected in the Implementing Regulation, relates to the 
ICES recommendations and the allocation key for 2012.137  The purpose of following ICES’ 
recommendations is to avoid collapse of the herring stock.  The EU’s desired level of protection 
was, therefore, directly related to keeping the Faroes within their 5% catch limit to avoid 
collapse of the stock.  Because herring and mackerel are associated species, to the point at which 
is difficult to catch one without catching the other, the EU also needed to prevent imports of 
mackerel to achieve its desired level of protection.138 
This led to a total import ban being imposed on Faroese herring and related products which is 
highly trade restrictive.  In Brazil-Tyres the AB found that, while a total import ban is 
permissible, the measure imposing the ban must make a material contribution to the objective at 
issue.139  However, the AB did recognise that a measure may simply be one of a series of 
measures designed to deal with a complex environmental problem, in which case it could be 
difficult to determine the contribution which one particular measure might make in dealing with 
the problem.140   
In order to effectively combat IUU fishing the EU has promulgated the Shared Stocks and IUU 
Regulations, which includes a number of PSMs.  Implementing Regulations or Decisions are 
imposed in specific cases, and there have been several designating a country a non-cooperating 
country under the IUU Regulation (those countries which cannot effectively police IUU fishing 
in their own waters).141  The Control Regulation also provides for measures to be taken by EU 
states to control and monitor fisheries.142  These Regulations do appear to be having an impact 
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on IUU fishing as they have led a number of countries to implement and enforce IUU fishing 
measures.143 
It also appears that there are no less trade-restrictive means that could be taken in this situation.  
The Shared Stocks Regulation provides for a number of measures that may be taken by the EU to 
sanction states which must be ‘proportionate to the objectives pursued’.144  The Implementing 
Regulation sets out a number of alternatives in this regard and provides cogent reasons as to why 
none of the less-restrictive options are feasible.  For example, the restrictions on both herring and 
mackerel are justified by the fact that these species cohabit in spring and summer to such an 
extent that it is impossible to catch one without catching the other.  Allowing mackerel imports 
from the Faroes into the EU would, therefore, mean that high numbers of herring continued to be 
caught by the Faroes.145   
Arguably, the EU could have imposed a less-restrictive trade measure in these circumstances in 
the form of a quota on herring shipped from the Faroes, limited to the 5% catch limit assigned to 
the Faroes by the NEAFC contracting parties in 2012.146  In 2012 around 70% of Faroese 
mackerel and herring catches were exported to the EU.147  This represents about 36000 tonnes of 
herring148, slightly more than the 31000 tonne limit imposed on the Faroes by the NEAFC parties 
for 2013.149  It appears, therefore, that the imposition of a quota of 5% would not be effective in 
preventing stock collapse as the EU would be importing only slightly less herring than it had 
imported in the previous year while the surplus herring could be sold to other markets.  The 
Faroes was indeed attempting to find markets in Africa and Russia after the EU restrictions were 
announced.150  This, of course, raises the issue that all the herring and mackerel caught by the 
Faroes could be sold to other markets, in which case even a full import ban would be ineffective.  
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Without the EU market however, the export value of the herring would decrease.151  The Faroes 
would then have to decide whether selling a greater amount of herring at a lower price or a 
smaller amount at a higher price would yield the greatest amount of revenue.  Allowing the same 
amount of herring to be imported to the EU as had been imported in the previous year would 
give access to these higher prices and render the decision a simple one.  The imposition of a total 
import ban was therefore the only way to achieve the EU’s objective of preventing IUU fishing 
of herring.  In determining whether this would have been effective in the circumstances, the cost-
benefit analysis discussed would have to be conducted.   
In addition, the lack of a quota on mackerel, the associated species, would, as pointed out by the 
EU, mean that mackerel, and therefore herring, continued to be caught in high amounts.  If such 
herring could not be imported to other trading partners it would be wasted, neither of which 
would assist in the protection of the herring stock.   
The proposed less-restrictive measure should also be reasonable in the circumstances.  In Brazil-
Tyres the AB stated that the ability of a country to implement particularly costly measures may 
be relevant in assessing whether these measures are reasonably available alternatives to the 
challenged measure.152  In the herring dispute the monitoring of a quota would put a heavy 
administrative and cost burden on the EU, particularly as the quota would extend to fisheries 
products which are often made up of a number of components. 
This analysis suggests that there are indeed no less trade-restrictive alternatives available in the 
herring dispute.  As the EU Regulations also make a contribution to the EU’s policy of 
combatting IUU fishing, which serves a number of important interests, it is likely that, on the 
basis of past jurisprudence153, a Panel would have found these factors to outweigh the trade 
restrictiveness of the ban.  The EU Regulations would therefore be provisionally justified under 
Article XX(b) if they were also found to have been promulgated for the purpose of protecting 
herring life or health. 
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(iii) Article XX(g)     
There are three parts to Article XX(g) – a measure must be for the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource, must be reasonably related154 to the objective of the WTO Member of 
conserving such resource and must be even-handed, in that it either applies to, or similar 
measures are applied to, domestic production or consumption.155 
In two pre-WTO cases tuna, herring and salmon were held to be exhaustible natural resources156 
and in US-Shrimp, the AB made it clear that an exhaustible natural resource may be one that is 
renewable, but is susceptible to ‘depletion, exhaustion and extinction’.157  The AB also relied on 
CITES158 and UNCLOS159 to find that the turtles the US were trying to protect were exhaustible 
natural resources. 
Although herring is not in the CITES appendices, it is recognised by ICES and NEAFC as in 
need of management to prevent stock collapse.  The EU and Faroes are also required to 
cooperate to conserve straddling fish stocks under UNCLOS and UNFSA.160  A number of FAO 
Agreements further provide for cooperation to conserve fish stocks.161  The FAO has 
traditionally been closely related to the WTO with the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) specifically directing WTO Members to rely on the standards of the FAO and 
WHO body, Codex Alimentarius, when creating SPS measures.162   Coupled with the explicit 
recognition in earlier GATT-era cases that fish, including herring, is an exhaustible natural 
resource, a Panel would almost certainly find herring to be an exhaustible natural resource.   
In US-Shrimp, the AB did not comment on the issue of extra-territoriality, finding instead that 
there was a ‘nexus’ between the United States and the turtles the measure aimed to protect, as the 
turtles passed through US waters while migrating.163  It is possible that the Faroes would have 
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raised this argument had the herring dispute gone to a panel, as it alleged in its 2014 statement on 
the herring dispute that there is a ‘virtual absence of Atlanto-Scandian herring in EU waters’.164  
However, it seems that herring do pass through EU waters but have simply been overfished.165  It 
was also recognised in US-Tuna II that under general international law a state may regulate its 
nationals, including its fishermen and vessels flying its flag, with regard to natural resources 
outside its territory.  The US therefore pursued its policy to conserve dolphins in the eastern 
tropical Pacific ‘within its jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels’.166  Another potential 
argument to an allegation that there is no nexus between a state and fish stocks is that the oceans 
are inter-connected, with actions taken in one part invariably affecting the whole.  Although the 
AB in US-Shrimp did not need to deal with the issue of extra-territoriality as sea turtles migrate 
through US waters, the argument could be made, especially in light of the recognition that the 
ocean is a shared resource in UNCLOS.167  Certainly, Tanaka is of the view that the ocean ‘is 
one unit, at least in a physical sense’ and that many species do not respect man-made boundaries, 
such as the EEZs provided for in UNCLOS.168   
The second issue – whether a measure is related to a Member’s policy objective – is satisfied by 
considering whether there is a reasonable relationship between means and ends.  In other words 
the measure must not be too broad in scope to achieve its policy objective.169  In US-Tuna II the 
Panel found that a measure which attempts to force another state to change its policies could 
never be justified under the GATT.170  However, the AB in US-Shrimp found that this would 
render many of the Article XX exceptions ineffective, and that such measures should be allowed 
in principle.171  In US-Shrimp the legislation was found not to be overbroad to achieve its 
objective as it took into account that in some areas there was a low risk of catching sea turtles 
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and that countries could use a regulatory program comparable to that used by the US with a 
comparable rate of incidental sea turtle take.172 
The purpose of promulgating the EU Regulations was to ensure the long term conservation of 
straddling fish stocks, in this case the herring stock.173  Such a purpose is permissible in light of 
US-Shrimp.  As mentioned, the Shared Stocks Regulation follows a proportionality approach 
when imposing sanctions for non-compliance.  This allowed the EU to tailor the Implementing 
Regulation to the circumstances of the case, and justify its reasons for imposing it.174  The EU 
Regulations therefore take a nuanced approach, and do not appear overbroad to achieve their 
objective of preventing IUU fishing.   
Motive was another issue raised in the context of the ‘related to’ criterion in US-Shrimp.175  The 
AB pointed out that the policy of conserving sea turtles was shared by the parties and third 
parties to the dispute and that ‘none of the parties…question the genuineness of the commitment 
of the others to that policy.’176  This is a potential issue that may arise in Article XX(g) cases.  
It is unlikely that the EU’s commitment to its policy objective of preventing IUU fishing is not a 
legitimate one.  Its actions to prevent IUU fishing in other areas, including the sanctioning of 
non-cooperating countries177 and efforts to assist these countries178 certainly do not appear to be 
protectionist in any way.  However, in the particular circumstances of the herring dispute, the EU 
may have had another basis on which to impose the sanctions – namely to prevent the Faroes 
receiving a higher share of the TAC.  Had the Faroes been given a higher allocation this would 
likely have reduced the EU’s share.  The EU has been accused of taking advantage of poor 
countries in the past, notably regarding the buying of fishing rights in developing countries such 
as Mozambique, Morocco and Ivory Coast179 and its motives could potentially have been in 
question if the herring dispute had gone to a Panel.  However, it is more likely that a panel would 
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have dealt with this issue under the Chapeau in the context of discrimination, as there is only 
passing mention of this issue in US-Shrimp, and therefore little guidance on the matter in WTO 
jurisprudence.  
The third requirement of Article XX(g) is that a measure must be even-handed.  The Shared 
Stocks Regulation provides specifically for the sanctioning of other countries for non-
cooperation through trade measures, which cannot be applied to its member states.  However, the 
IUU and Control Regulations, as noted above,180 place catch restrictions on EU states and 
nationals, and provide sanctions if these restrictions are not adhered to.  Thus, the EU 
Regulations, IUU regulation and Control Regulation together appear to satisfy the requirement of 
even-handedness on their face.  Whether the measures are applied evenhandedly in practice is an 
aspect which the DSB bodies deal with under the Chapeau. 
B. The Chapeau 
Based on the foregoing, a DSB body could certainly find that the EU Regulations are 
preliminarily justified under at least Article XX(g) of the GATT, although there is a slight 
possibility that the EU’s motives for imposing the EU Regulations may be questioned.  A DSB 
body would then go on to analyse the EU Regulations under the Chapeau. 
The purpose of the Chapeau is to prevent a WTO Member using the Article XX exceptions to 
derogate from its basic WTO obligations of non-discrimination and non-protectionism.  The task 
of a DSB body is to balance the right of WTO Members to take measures to protect the 
important interests recognised in Articles XX(a)-(j), against the rights of other Members under 
substantive GATT provisions.  This balance may shift depending on the facts of the case.181  For 
example, if the issue at stake is particularly important, such as the protection of humans from 
cancer-causing asbestos fibres, the rights of Members to prevent the importation of these fibres 
may shift the balance in favour of the right to take measures under Article XX.   
                                                          
180 See Chap II(C), particularly notes 102-108.  
181 US-Shrimp AB paras 156-159. 
37 
 
In analysing a measure under the Chapeau, a DSB body will consider whether the legislation is 
applied evenhandedly in practice182 (which can often be ascertained by a consideration of the 
measure itself),183 and whether a measure is a disguised restriction on international trade. 
(i) Unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
There has often been an amalgamation of the concepts of unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination by DSB bodies,184 but in US-Shrimp the AB distinguished these concepts.  The 
AB found that the US measures unjustifiably discriminated between certain countries185 for a 
number of reasons. 
First, the US legislation was inflexible.  It accorded different treatment to countries where the 
same conditions prevail by negotiating with, and assisting, only certain poor Caribbean countries 
to implement TEDs.  It also applied the same treatment to countries where different conditions 
prevail by imposing the same import ban on all countries which had not yet implemented TEDs, 
with a warning period of only four months.  This meant that poorer countries with limited 
resources were held to the same standard as those with greater resources which could equip their 
shrimp vessels with TEDs in a shorter time period.  In addition, although the legislative measure 
recognised that it was acceptable for countries to adopt different regulatory programs to conserve 
turtles, as long as these programs had results comparable to the US program, in practice the 
legislation was applied in such a way that only countries that used TEDs were allowed to import 
shrimp into the US.186   
The AB clarified its position on the flexibility issue in US-Shrimp 21.5.  The AB stated that it 
was only necessary to create legislation that was flexible in the sense that it allowed for countries 
in different situations to adapt or put in place policies different to those of the US, provided these 
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met the level of protection required by the US.  There was, therefore, no need to take into 
account the situation prevailing in each and every country that imported shrimp into the US.187   
On this basis of the findings in the US-Shrimp cases, the EU regulations may be discriminatory 
in their application.  Spanish fishers are some of the worst offenders when it comes to IUU 
fishing188 yet, despite this, the EU and Spain continue to subsidise not only the Spanish fishing 
industry but specific offenders,189 and it has been estimated that a third of the fish caught by 
Spanish fleets is subsidised.190  As an EU state, Spain is subject to EU fishing quotas, including 
those for herring and mackerel,191 but has been found guilty of failing to enforce catch limits by 
the European Court of Justice.192  Due primarily to capacity building through subsidies, the 
Spanish fleet is very large,193 and catches many types of fish.  Spanish vessels fish not only on 
the high seas and in Spanish waters but also in the waters of other EU states194 and, by 
agreement, countries such as Morocco and Mauritania.195  Some of its main catches include 
mackerel and other straddling and highly migratory species such as tuna and sardines,196 which 
are the type of stocks covered by the Shared Stocks Agreement.  Subsidising Spanish vessels 
which catch these species creates greater potential for overfishing and flouting of quotas,197 the 
very issue that the EU is attempting to prevent through its Shared Stocks Regulation.  In 
addition, by continuing to give subsidies to those vessels engaged in IUU fishing, the EU is 
incentivising, rather than punishing, those engaged in IUU fishing.  This is at odds with its 
conduct towards third parties engaged in IUU fishing, such as the Faroes. 
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In US-Gasoline the AB made it clear that it is possible for a country to discriminate unfairly not 
only between different third party countries but also between a third party country and itself.198  
It is therefore possible that the EU’s different treatment of its own citizens and those of third 
party countries could lead to a finding that the EU Regulations constitute unfair discrimination 
under the Chapeau. 
The second problem the AB in US-Shrimp identified was a lack of multilateral cooperation.  This 
was required by the US legislation itself, and had been undertaken with regard to the Caribbean 
countries in negotiating to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of 
Sea Turtles.199  The fact that the US had not entered into multilateral talks with other countries 
meant that it had unjustifiably discriminated between the Caribbean states and other states.200  
The issue of multilateral cooperation was also clarified in US-Shrimp 21.5, with the AB finding 
that this referred only to ‘serious, good faith efforts’ to reach agreement, and that it was not 
necessary to show that an agreement had actually been concluded.201 
Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason argue that the issue of multilateral cooperation may become 
irrelevant where a measure is sufficiently flexible to take account of different conditions in 
different countries.  This argument is based on the failure of the AB in US-Shrimp 21.5 to 
mention the importance of multilateral cooperation in regard to environmental trade measures.202  
The AB also made it clear in US-Shrimp 21.5 (clarifying its finding in US-Shrimp) that unilateral 
measures are permissible in certain instances.203 
However, the AB in US-Shrimp did emphasise that conservation of common resources will 
usually require some level of multilateral cooperation to be effective.204  It also clearly 
differentiated this reasoning from its points that the US measure specifically advocated 
cooperation, and that the lack of cooperation constituted discrimination because the US had 
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already negotiated with various Caribbean states.   Multilateral cooperation also appears to be a 
theme in cases where the impugned measure deals with a common resource.  In US-Gasoline a 
failure on the part of the US to cooperate with Venezuela and Brazil to calculate baselines for 
foreign gasoline producers to preserve air quality also led to the US contravening the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Chapeau.205  The WTO Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment, in establishing the terms of reference of the Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE), provided that the CTE should make recommendations on changes to the multilateral 
trading system to promote ‘adherence to effective multilateral disciplines to ensure 
responsiveness of the multilateral trading system to environmental objectives set forth in Agenda 
21 and the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle 12.’206  Principle 12 provides that 
‘(e)nvironmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, 
as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.’207  The CTE subsequently stated that 
it supported ‘multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best 
and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or 
global nature.’208  The Ministerial Decision was also referred to by the AB in US-Shrimp209 in its 
finding that the protection of highly migratory sea turtles required ‘concerted and cooperative 
efforts on the part of many countries’.210  Even in EC-Seals, a case which was concerned more 
with the prevention of cruelty to animals than the sharing of a common resource, the AB found 
that the EU’s failure to pursue ‘cooperative arrangements’ with Canadian Inuit under the IC 
exception, as it had done with Greenlandic Inuit, contributed to the inconsistency of the seal 
regulations with the Chapeau.211 
In the herring dispute the EU and Faroes were required to cooperate under the auspices of 
UNCLOS and UNFSA, and did so through NEAFC.  UNCLOS obliges state parties to cooperate 
in the conservation of living resources, including shared resources,212 and resources in the high 
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seas.213  Under Articles 63(1) and (2) of UNCLOS states must ‘seek to agree’ on conservation 
measures for shared stocks.  ITLOS, in its Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing (IUU Fishing 
Opinion), found that Article 63(1) requires states to consult meaningfully with each other to 
ensure conservation of shared stocks.214  This is similar language to that used in US-Shrimp 
21.5215 and ITLOS was clear that states should make a substantial effort in this regard.216  These 
findings are reiterated and expanded upon in UNFSA.217  Many other international fishing 
instruments also advocate for cooperation and consultation in the creation of measures to 
conserve species.218 
UNFSA and UNCLOS, as interpreted in the IUU Fishing Opinion, both place an obligation on 
parties to consult with each other to conserve fish stocks and, furthermore, give each party a right 
to consult in an RFMO.219  This bolsters the argument that there was a duty on the parties to 
attempt multilateral cooperation in the herring dispute, as the straddling nature of the herring 
stock, as with the migratory turtles in US-Shrimp, means that cooperation is necessary for its 
conservation and management.  This suggests that there was a duty to cooperate in conserving 
the stock in this case, which a DSB body could have taken into account in line with its use of 
external sources to interpret the GATT in US-Shrimp.  The use of non-WTO sources to interpret 
WTO law will be discussed further in Chapter IV. 
A final point which may make the EU Regulations unjustifiable, and possibly also arbitrary, is 
the fact that the EU based its designation of the Faroes as an NSF country on the precautionary 
approach adopted in the herring management agreement.  Adopting a precautionary approach is 
in line with Article 6 of UNFSA which provides that states should apply this approach to the 
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conservation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.220  This includes ‘stock-specific 
reference points’221 which may be imposition of a limit on fishing within which maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) can be produced.222  The NEAFC parties agreed that a precautionary 
approach should be taken in the herring management plan in order to ensure sustainability of the 
herring stock.223  This was in line with ICES recommendations that allowing the herring stock to 
fall below the stock spawning biomass (SSB) necessary to produce MSY (5 million tonnes) 
would make the plan non-precautionary.224  The parties decided that fishing of the stock should 
be restricted by a TAC based on a mortality rate of less than 0.125 and, should the SSB fall 
below 5 million tonnes, fishing mortality would be reduced further to allow it to recover.225  The 
catch quota of 105230 tonnes set unilaterally by the Faroes would have increased the mortality 
rate to 0.15 and caused the SSB to fall to 4.2 million tonnes.226   
The DSB bodies were unwilling to recognise the precautionary principle as a general principle of 
customary international law in EC-Biotech227 and EC-Hormones,228 although the latter did find 
that a truncated version of the principle had been negotiated by WTO Members and incorporated 
in the SPS.  Because of this however, the AB stated that the precautionary approach could not 
override an obligation negotiated by WTO Members.  The AB did also appear willing to 
recognise that the precautionary principle had become a general principle of international 
environmental law.229  Priess and Pitschas are of the view that this principle has no place in a 
GATT Article XX(b) or TBT Article 2.2 analysis, based on statements made in the case of EC-
Asbestos that there must be evidence of a risk to invoke the Article XX(b) exception.230  This 
makes sense, as the precautionary principle allows measures to be imposed even in the absence 
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of a known risk if the science is uncertain.  However, Priess and Pitschas also believe that if a 
treaty between parties is shown to encompass the precautionary principle this should be 
respected and WTO obligations accordingly modified through rules of treaty interpretation.231 
This will be discussed further in Chapter IV.  
In applying Article XX, the DSB bodies have stated that a WTO Member is free to decide its 
own level of protection when passing a measure, provided the measure has as its goal one of the 
permissible exceptions.232  This means that, in the context of Article XX(g), a Member is given a 
significant amount of freedom in determining their own environmental policies and domestic 
measures.  Although there must be a risk to life or health for Article XX(b) to be applicable, this 
is not the case with XX(g).  There seems to be no reason that an environmental measure which 
bases its conservation targets on a precautionary approach should contravene Article XX(g), 
provided the purpose of the measure is the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource and 
similar domestic restrictions are put in place.  Based on the findings of the AB in EC-Hormones, 
a Panel may very well be open to the argument that a precautionary approach could be applied to 
determine a Member’s desired level of protection under Article XX(g), as there is no contrary 
intention evident in the GATT and the principle is contained in a number of MEAs.  It is also 
present in the specific agreement between the parties to conserve the stock, and should, 
therefore, be given effect to, according to Priess and Pitschas.     
(ii) Arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
Arbitrary discrimination was also an issue in US-Shrimp.  The AB found that the manner in 
which the US dealt with requests by applicants to be placed on the list of countries that could 
import shrimp into the US, contravened this aspect of the Chapeau.233  Applicants were not 
informed if they were unsuccessful and no written decisions were issued to either successful or 
unsuccessful applicants.  There was no possibility of review or appeal of the decisions, and no 
opportunity for the rejected applicant to be heard or respond to any arguments against it.234  This 
meant that there was no way to tell if the rejected state was being treated fairly or not, an issue 
which the AB also highlighted in EC-Seals when it found the terms ‘subsistence’ and ‘partial 
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use’, in describing seals subject to the IC exception, to be ambiguous and open to interpretation.  
According to the AB, this could lead to unfairness in the application of the measure.235   
In US-Shrimp the conduct of the US was also held to be contrary to Article X:3 of the GATT 
which establishes certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness.236  This 
imported a due process requirement into the Chapeau, although the extent of the requirement is 
not clear from the case.237  Urakami is of the view that this will depend on the trade 
restrictiveness of the measure.238 
Arbitrary discrimination may also occur in other ways.  In Brazil-Tyres, the AB found that a 
measure to prevent the importation of retreaded tyres into Brazil, while justifiable under Article 
XX(b) of the GATT, contravened the Chapeau because of an exception to the ban for a number 
of MERCOSUR countries, which Brazil had to include in its measure because of a MERCOSUR 
Tribunal ruling.  Despite Brazil having no choice in the matter, the AB reasoned that the 
exception undermined the purpose of the ban, as retreaded tyres could be imported into Brazil 
through the MERCOSUR countries.239  In interpreting Article 2.1 of the TBT, the AB in US-
Tuna III 21.5 found the principle that a measure must not be applied in a manner that undermines 
the purpose of the measure, is one of the most important factors when considering the issue of 
unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination.240   
The Shared Stocks Regulation provides for NSF countries to be heard before any trade measures 
are taken,241 and the Implementing Regulation set out the Faroese arguments and why these were 
not accepted by the EC.242  It described the process followed in detail and provided 
comprehensive reasons why the most restrictive trade measure had to be imposed in this case.243 
In doing so, the Implementing Regulation set out a written, reasoned decision which was then 
made public.  However, what constitutes an NSF country in the Shared Stocks Regulation is 
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vague in certain respects.  One of the criteria is that the country ‘fails to adopt necessary fishery 
management measures’244 with no explanation of what these would entail, which denotes a level 
of ambiguity.  However, there is scientific data from bodies like ICES showing the level at which 
stocks need to be maintained to prevent their collapse.  It may be, therefore, that if the matter 
was before a Panel, recourse to its DSU Article 13 power to seek scientific data would show that 
such criteria is not in fact ambiguous in the circumstances.245  Certainly there is clear evidence of 
the MSY for herring from ICES, which would provide context as to which measures should have 
been adopted by the Faroes to conserve the herring stock.  If so, the many due process elements 
in the EU Regulations would appear to make them fair, despite the trade restrictiveness of the 
measure.  Regarding the interpretation given to arbitrary discrimination in Brazil-Tyres, the EU 
Regulations do not appear to undermine the purpose of preventing IUU fishing on their face.  In 
practice, however, the EU’s subsidies to its fishing fleets, increasing their ability and incentive to 
exceed quotas and engage in IUU fishing, could be said to undermine the EU Regulations and 
amount to arbitrary discrimination.   
(iii) Disguised restriction on international trade 
There have been very few WTO cases dealing with the third element of the Chapeau.  In US-
Canada Tuna (a pre-WTO case) the Panel decided that, to be compliant with this element of the 
Chapeau, a measure must be taken as a trade measure and publicly announced as such.246  
However, after the creation of the WTO, the AB in US-Gasoline found that publicly announcing 
a trade measure is not enough to satisfy the third requirement of the Chapeau.247    
In US-Gasoline, the AB found that a disguised restriction on international trade may also 
encompass restrictions amounting to arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.248  The concept 
also had a distinct role to play in this case however, as the US measure alleviated certain costs 
for domestic but not foreign gasoline producers.  According to the AB, this suggested a disguised 
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restriction.249  Based on the AB’s reasoning, it appears that this element of the Chapeau is 
designed to prevent protectionism. 
The demand in the EU for fish surpasses its fishing capacity, and the EU is therefore dependent 
on imports from third countries to meet demand.250  However, given that fishing of herring is 
restricted, the purpose of the EU Regulations may arguably have been to protect the EU’s share 
of the TAC and the fishing potential of its own fishing fleets.  There are certainly indications of 
protectionism in the fact that the EU continually subsidises its own fishing fleet, thereby 
increasing capacity, while the EU Regulations attempt to curtail fishing by third country vessels. 
This, like many of the issues raised in the Chapeau analysis, requires further information to 
resolve.  As mentioned, Panels have the power to seek information under Article 13 of the 
DSU.251  Had the herring dispute gone to Panel, it could have resolved these issues by recourse 
to this Article.   
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Chapter IV – Conflict of Norms 
Based on the analysis in the preceding two chapters there is a possibility that the EU Regulations 
will not be compliant with WTO law, based on principles extrapolated from WTO jurisprudence.  
This may be because of a lack of multilateral cooperation between the parties, or because the 
measures are discriminatory.   
However, the EU based its Regulations on a number of multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) to which it is a signatory.  These agreements allow, and sometimes require, state parties 
to take the sort of measures found in the EU Regulations.  This means that, if the violation of 
Articles V, and potentially I and XI of the GATT, cannot be justified under Article XX of the 
GATT, there may be a conflict of norms between provisions of the MEAs and the GATT.   
A. Potential conflicts 
As discussed in Chapter I, there are a number of MEAs dealing with IUU fishing.  Certain of 
these MEAs, such as UNFSA and the herring management plan, were specifically referred to in 
the EU Regulations,252 and the IPOA-IUU was used as a basis for the IUU Regulation.253 Others 
are the PSMA, NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (NEAFC Scheme) which 
specifically regulates herring254and the FAO Fisheries Code.  
The EU, in its Implementing Regulation, alleged that the Faroes had contravened Articles 61(2), 
63(1) and (2), 118, 119 and 300 of UNCLOS and Articles 5, 6, 8(1) and (2) of UNFSA.255  Had 
the herring dispute gone before a Panel, the EU may have raised these provisions as a defence to 
a finding that the EU Regulations are GATT-inconsistent.  Article 300 provides that states 
should fulfil their UNCLOS obligations in good faith.  This is fairly open-ended and does not 
really lend itself to any concrete obligations.  Article 61(2) requires that states conserve stocks in 
their own EEZ and cooperate with other states to do so.  Articles 63(1) and (2) require that 
parties cooperate to conserve straddling fish stocks.  Articles 118 and 119 similarly provide that 
states should cooperate through RFMOs to maintain stocks found on the high seas.  Articles 5, 6 
                                                          
252 Shared Stocks Regulation Preamble 1; Implementing Regulation Preamble 9-10. 
253 IUU Regulation Preamble 1 and 4. 
254 NEAFC Scheme. 
255 Implementing Regulation Preamble 10. 
48 
 
and 8 of UNFSA expand on the UNCLOS common stocks provisions, creating more detailed 
methods of conservation.  
The UNCLOS common stocks provisions in Articles 63, 118 and 119, and Article 8 of UNFSA 
appear to accord with WTO law.  As discussed, the AB in US-Shrimp found that parties relying 
on Article XX of the GATT should use best efforts to come to an agreement prior to imposing 
unilateral measures, where they seek to protect a common resource.  
The situation may be different regarding Articles 5 and 6 of UNFSA, under which parties must 
use a precautionary approach in conserving fish stocks.  The herring management agreement also 
provides for a precautionary approach.  A precautionary approach has not been recognised as a 
valid defence to non-compliance with WTO law by DSB bodies in the past.256  One way to 
reconcile the precautionary approach with the GATT in the herring dispute was suggested in 
Chapter III – namely that a DSB body may allow a precautionary approach to be adopted by a 
Member when assessing consistency with Article XX(g).  It was also noted that Priess and 
Pitschas believe that a precautionary approach specifically provided for in a treaty should be 
respected, and that the AB in EC-Hormones appeared willing to recognise a precautionary 
approach as applicable in international environmental law.257  Other international tribunals, such 
as ITLOS in its advisory opinion on the Area (seabed),258 and the ICJ in the recent Pulp Mills 
case,259 appear to recognise the precautionary principle in environmental cases.  
The precautionary approach is also closely related to the ecosystem approach, which aims to 
create conservation measures based not only on the levels of the fish stock in question but also 
the impact that catching the fish stock has on its environment and other fish species.  The 
ecosystem approach is increasingly being recognised as a better means than MSY to conserve 
and manage fish stocks in RFMOs such as CCAMLR,260 as well as in UNFSA261 and the FAO 
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Fisheries Code.262  A precautionary approach is, therefore, particularly important in conserving 
fish stocks.  This provides further evidence that a DSB body should recognise the development 
of a precautionary approach in the context of fisheries law, despite not yet recognising it as a 
general principle of international law.  
Apart from those provisions mentioned by the EU in its Implementing Regulation, there are a 
number of other MEAs which the EU could have raised as a defence in the herring dispute. 
Article 23(3) of UNFSA provides that states may prohibit landings and transhipments where fish 
have been taken in a manner which ‘undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or 
global conservation and management measures on the high seas’.263  This provision appears to 
conflict with at least Article V of the GATT as it allows states to prevent transit of goods and 
transhipment within their ports.  It is also possible that this Article conflicts with Articles XI and 
I of the GATT if, by preventing entry into its ports to certain vessels, it discriminates between 
like products from WTO Members, or can be said to be imposing quantitative restrictions on 
imports.264  Article 23(3) of UNFSA only applies to fish taken on the high seas.  However, 
Article 23(1) provides that a port state has ‘the right and the duty to take measures in accordance 
with international law, to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global 
conservation and management measures.’265  This provision, while not as specific as Article 
23(3), does include catches taken in the EEZ.   
Article 23(4) of the NEAFC Scheme obliges a NEAFC party to prevent another NEAFC party’s 
vessel from landing, transhipping a catch or using its ports when the vessel is in breach of local 
regulations dealing with fisheries resources in the Convention Area.  Local regulations would 
include the EU Regulations.  Similarly, Articles 9(4) and 11 of the PSMA oblige contracting 
parties to deny entry to ports to those vessels engaged in IUU fishing. These NEAFC and PSMA 
provisions, like Article 23(3) of UNFSA, are likely to contravene Article V, and possibly 
Articles I and XI of the GATT.   
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The IPOA-IUU, like the PSMA, provides that states should deny entry to their ports to vessels 
involved in IUU fishing,266 and the FAO Fisheries Code also provides that PSMs should be taken 
to achieve the objectives set out therein.267  While these soft law instruments are not binding on 
the EU and Faroes, it should be noted that they have been highly influential documents in the 
management of fisheries by states.268   
The above analysis has shown that there are a number of provisions of relevant MEAs which 
appear to conflict with the GATT, and could have been relied upon by the EU in the herring 
dispute as a defence to GATT-inconsistency.  This raises the issue of how conflict of norms is 
dealt with in international law and, specifically, how DSB bodies deal with conflict. 
B. Conflict resolution in international law 
Conflict in international law is generally more difficult to resolve than conflict in domestic law 
as international law is largely made up of overlapping treaties and, apart from jus cogens and 
erga omnes norms, has no obvious hierarchy of norms.  Commentators have put forward 
different views as to how international tribunals faced with conflicting law should resolve a clash 
and there appear to be two broad approaches to addressing conflict at the stage of dispute 
resolution. 
(i) Conventional Method 
The conventional method is that advocated by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its 
2006 recommendations on the fragmentation of international law (ILC Study).  The ILC drew 
widely on the practice and jurisprudence of international bodies and academic works to provide 
guidance on how to resolve conflicts in international law.269   
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The ILC Study stressed that conflict rules cannot be divorced from the process of interpretation 
as it is interpretation of norms which gives rise to conflicts.270  It therefore appears to advocates 
reconciliation of law through interpretation here, although it did warn that this should not be 
taken too far, as reconciliation cannot resolve cases of genuine conflict.271   
In cases of genuine conflict the ILC Study provides a series of presumptions to determine when 
one law should override the other, including the presumption against conflict and the 
presumptions that the lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior trump other international laws 
(collectively the conflict presumptions).272  
Lex superior are obligations under the UN Charter, and jus cogens and erga omnes norms, which 
are non-derogable norms.  A hierarchy is created by differentiation between lex superior and 
other norms, and lex superior will override all other international norms.273   
Lex posterior are those laws that arise later in time and are presumed to override laws entered 
into earlier in time, as the later law is seen as a better reflection of the current intention of the 
parties.  In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) this rule is reflected in 
Articles 30 (application of successive treaties dealing with the same subject matter) and Article 
41 (where certain parties to the treaty purport to modify a provision of that treaty in a later treaty 
– an inter se agreement - applicable only amongst themselves).  For the purposes of the herring 
dispute, only Article 41 is relevant, as none of the MEAs discussed are successive treaties to the 
GATT or vice versa.  Because of the potentially far-reaching consequences of inter se 
agreements, Article 41 is worded to as to ensure that, where the treaty does not specifically 
prohibit inter se agreements, the rights of third parties are not impacted, and the object and 
purpose of the treaty is not undermined.274  This embodies the pacta tertiis principle, under 
which the conclusion or modification of a treaty should not affect the rights of third parties.275   
A lex specialis is a law which deals specifically with the subject matter in question, and this will 
prevail over general law on the issue, again because the lex superior better reflects the intention 
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of the parties.  It is therefore presumed that the parties intended to regulate a certain aspect of the 
law in the different manner.276  This relationship can be seen in an example by Pauwelyn, who 
compares the SPS (the general law), dealing with all sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
regardless of the health concern, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the lex specialis) 
which deals only with specific health concerns, such as genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs).277  ‘General law’ in this context includes customary law, but the ILC Study did not deal 
with soft law such as FAO Fisheries Code or IPOA-IUU and, as such, these instruments do not 
appear to be relevant in a conventional conflict analysis.278  
The conflict presumptions are not always easy to apply in practice.  A common problem in 
determining the lex posterior is that it is often difficult to tell which law is later in time.  If, for 
example, Agreement X was entered into in 2001, and Agreement Y in 2003, but Agreement X 
was revised in 2005, which agreement is considered the lex posterior?279  Another issue is the 
fact that states may become parties to agreements at different times so that State A becomes a 
party to Agreement X before Agreement Y, and vice versa for State B.280  There is also no tie-
breaker rule when conflicting results arise in an application of these conflict presumptions.281 
These problems have led the ILC to conclude that the way these presumptions are applied is 
dependent on the relevant aspects of each case.282  It has also suggested that, in order to resolve 
problems in applying the lex posterior presumption, parties should include conflict clauses in 
their agreements detailing what should be done with prior or subsequent conflicting 
agreements.283  However, the various conflict presumptions enumerated in the report provide ‘a 
basic professional tool-box that is able to respond in a flexible way to most substantive 
fragmentation problems.’284  
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(ii) Institutional method 
The institutional method emphasises cooperation and coordination between regimes, although 
this is often at the level of law making rather than dispute settlement.285  Specifically in the 
context of trade and fisheries, Young has developed a method of ‘regime interaction’ applying to 
both law making and application, including at the level of dispute settlement.286  This involves 
taking cognisance of relevant non-WTO international law in deciding a case, in order to avoid 
fragmentation between non-WTO law and WTO law.  Non-WTO law can be brought to the 
attention of a DSB body through consultation with IGO secretariats287 and acceptance of amicus 
briefs from NGOs and other bodies.288  Young therefore advocates for greater collaboration with 
secretariats, and transparency regarding the use by DSB bodies of amicus briefs, to assist both 
DSB bodies and other actors in the WTO to better understand when non-WTO law is relevant to 
a dispute.289   
Cooperation by the WTO with IGOs and NGOs is also advocated by Perez.290  However, Perez 
points to several problems in doing so, including the fact that IGOs are susceptible to pressure 
from national government and that the choice of issues by NGOs may depend on certain 
institutional pressures, such as stable funding and the recruitment of new members.291  Perhaps 
because of these types of issues, Young suggests that DSB bodies should take into account the 
transparency and accessibility of the internal processes of IGOs when accepting evaluating 
norms produced by these bodies.292  In determining the relevance of non-WTO law produced by 
IGOs and NGOs, DSB bodies should also consider the breadth of an organisation’s support, 
where it gets its funding, demonstrated expertise in the area, and the balance of its membership 
between developed and developing countries.293   
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Importantly, the institutional method does not require that parties to the conflicting agreement be 
identical, because the agreements are part of international law and may therefore be relevant to 
the dispute.294  On this view the ILC ‘toolbox’ is not entirely discounted295 but Young believes 
that it is not particularly useful in the trade and fisheries context.  This is because environmental 
law, and especially fisheries law, is comprised of a large number of overlapping treaties and 
international bodies which have memberships that do not correspond exactly.  There are also no 
norms that could be considered hierarchically superior in these regimes.296   
Young is of the view that the AB applied the institutional method in US-Shrimp as it took into 
account non-WTO sources in deciding the dispute,297 stated clearly that Panels could accept 
amicus briefs298 and, in applying non-WTO law, did not look at whether the parties to the dispute 
were also parties to the non-WTO agreements.299  Indeed, the US is not a party to UNCLOS, 
which was one of the agreements used by the AB to interpret Article XX(g).  Young also points 
to the fact that, In US-Shrimp 21.5, the Panel took this a step further and explicitly stated that the 
parties were bound by the international law rules cited in US-Shrimp.300   
The institutional view is important in the context of fisheries because it is such a sensitive area, 
as evidenced by the emotional nature of the various issues that accompany the problem of IUU 
fishing (food security for example).  This is also reflected in the WTO itself, in the large number 
of fisheries disputes that have been brought to the DSB bodies,301 and the negotiations currently 
underway on fisheries subsidies in the Doha Round.302     
This raises the issue of whether a Panel dealing with the herring dispute would have applied 
either of these methods in resolving conflict between WTO law and those MEAs dealing with 
PSMs for IUU fishing. 
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C.  Conflict in the WTO 
In determining how DSB bodies approach conflict of norms there are two questions that need to 
be addressed.  First, when do the DSB bodies consider there to be a conflict between norms?  
Second, if there is a conflict, how do they resolve such conflict? 
(i) When is there a conflict between norms? 
The first issue when dealing with conflict of laws is determining whether a conflict exists at all.  
A wide view of conflict considers there to be a conflict in the case where one provision prohibits 
a certain action while another permits it.  Compliance with the former therefore does not lead to 
non-compliance with the latter.  A narrow view considers that two provisions are only in conflict 
when both impose obligations, and compliance with one therefore leads to non-compliance with 
the other. 
Vranes considers the cases of Indonesia-Automobiles and Turkey-Textiles (Panel Report) to take 
a narrow view.303  In both these cases the respective Panels found that a special provision could 
prevail over a general provision only if it is impossible to apply these two provisions 
simultaneously.304  According to Vranes, EC-Bananas III takes a wide view, although he states 
that this case appears to deal more with norms of competence (those norms which confer 
competence to make other norms) than norms of conflict.305   However, the Panel in EC-Bananas 
III did state that a narrow definition of conflict ‘would render whole Articles or sections of 
Agreements covered by the WTO meaningless and run counter to the object and purpose of 
many agreements listed in Annex 1A,’306 an indication that it would accept a wide definition of 
conflict in future.   
WTO jurisprudence on this issue is therefore contradictory.  It should also be noted that all these 
cases deal with conflicts between WTO agreements, rather than WTO and non-WTO law. 
                                                          
303 Vranes, Erich Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law and Legal 
Theory (2009) at 14-15. 
304Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (WT/DS34/R) Report of the Panel adopted on 19 
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305 Vranes (Note 303) at 15-16. 
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adopted on 25 September 1997 para 7.159. 
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Bartels believes that, while the AB has never explicitly ruled on the issue, it is unlikely that it 
will decide that obligations somehow trump rights.307  He points to the fact that the WTO 
agreements ‘represent a carefully negotiated “balance of rights and obligations”’,308 a proposition 
which has been accepted by the AB.309  It is also reflected in the DSU, in terms of which the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided for in the covered agreements’.310  This suggests that, in the WTO, obligations do not 
necessarily trump rights in all cases.311   
Of course, Bartels’ conclusion that a wide approach to conflict should be taken when dealing 
with conflict between WTO agreements does not provide much insight into the issue of conflict 
between WTO and non-WTO norms.   
Vranes’ also conducts an analysis, which, unlike Bartels’, goes beyond WTO law.  Vranes finds 
that ‘a broad definition of conflict has arguably not yet unequivocally asserted itself in 
international law’.312  However, he does suggest that, by not recognising a conflict in such a 
situation, a tribunal may violate an obligation to apply valid law.313   
Pauwelyn gives a similar reason as to why tribunals should adopt a wide definition – namely that 
adopting a narrow definition of conflict ‘solves part of the problem by ignoring it.’314  He also 
points to the drafting history of Article 30 of the VCLT.  Article 30 was changed based on a 
comment by Israel that reference should be made to both the rights and obligations of States (my 
emphasis).315  DSB bodies referred to Article 30 in Japan-Film316 and EC-Poultry317 and this 
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on 23 July 1998 (EC-Poultry Panel) para 205.  
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acknowledgement of Article 30 by DSB bodies suggests that its drafting history may be accepted 
as interpretative guidance by DSB bodies.  
The ILC also adopted a wide definition of conflict in its Fragmentation Study, interpreting it as 
‘a situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem.’318 
In the herring dispute, an analysis of those MEAs which appear to have provisions conflicting 
with the GATT reveals the potential for conflict on an application of both the narrow and wide 
definition.  As discussed, Article 23(3) of UNFSA gives states a right to close their ports.  
Although academic opinion is in favour of a wide definition of conflict, WTO jurisprudence on 
the issue is contradictory.  If DSB bodies consider conflict to be defined narrowly, they would 
not consider there to be a conflict between Article 23(3) of UNFSA and Articles I, V and XI of 
the GATT, which create obligations.  Articles 23(4) of the NEAFC Scheme, 9(4) and 11 of the 
PSMA and Section 65 of the IPOA-IUU conflict with the GATT even on the narrow definition, 
as they oblige states to close their ports to vessels engaged in IUU fishing.319  
(ii) How do the DSB bodies resolve conflict? 
DSB bodies have often been resistant to the idea that non-WTO norms can override WTO 
norms,320 or indeed even be relevant in interpreting provisions of WTO agreements.321  This is 
perhaps because of the structure of the WTO, which has sometimes been referred to as a ‘self-
contained regime’322  This means that, in addition to specific rules within its area of competence, 
it also has secondary rules which relate to the settlement of disputes323 and, thus, does not allow 
unilateral determination of breach of such rules outside the framework of the WTO.324  The 
implication is that WTO law is somehow separate from general principles of public international 
law and need apply only WTO law to a dispute before it.   
                                                          
318 ILC Study paras 24-25. 
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However, the ILC believes that no international regime can ever be entirely self-contained, and 
that ‘when elucidating the content of the relevant rights and obligations, WTO bodies must 
situate those rights and obligations within the overall context of general international law 
(including the relevant environmental and human rights treaties).’325  Pauwelyn also points out 
that the idea that WTO law is separate from international law is held by virtually no academic 
author and cannot be found in any WTO decision or document.326  The idea of self-contained 
regimes is not sanctioned outside the WTO, with the ICJ and other bodies dismissing the notion 
that general international law does not affect certain specialised areas of international law.327  
However, many DSB bodies still appear reluctant to deal with conflicts between WTO and non-
WTO law and the majority of DSB bodies have embraced only certain of the presumptions and 
methods advocated by commentators for resolving conflict. 
(a) Reconciliation through interpretation 
The idea of reconciling agreements through interpretation appears to be advocated by both the 
conventional and the institutional methods.  Under the conventional method it is easier to 
separate the idea of reconciliation from the conflict presumptions, as these appear to be relevant 
only once reconciliation has failed.  The division is less clear under the institutional method, 
which uses a variety of methods in an attempt to harmonise international law, a large part of 
which is reconciliation of agreements through interpretation.  However, the institutional method 
also advocates consultation with IGOs and NGOs to further understand the relevance of non-
WTO law.  For the purposes of clarity and comparison with the conventional method, 
reconciliation through interpretation will be dealt with separately from other aspects of the 
institutional method in the analysis that follows.  However, it is important to bear in mind that 
there is not a clear division between the various approaches to harmonising international law in 
the institutional method.   
                                                          
325 Ibid para 170. 
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It is also important to note that, because the conventional method attempts to resolve conflict 
between specific laws, rather than generally attempting to harmonise international law, 
reconciliation through interpretation under the conventional method would only appear to be 
necessary where a potential conflict exists.  The institutional method, on the other hand, would 
attempt to harmonise all relevant international laws, regardless of whether a potential conflict 
exists or not.   
Under Article 3.2 of the DSU, DSB bodies appear to be restricted to deciding claims which arise 
under the WTO covered agreements.328  Article 3.2 requires the DSB to clarify the provisions of 
WTO agreements ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of international law.’  
The customary rules of interpretation refer, according to innumerable DSB bodies,329 to Articles 
31 and 32 of the VCLT.  Under Article 31, a treaty should be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning, in context (including taking into account subsequent 
agreements and relevant rules of international law) and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose.  
Article 32 provides that supplementary means of interpretation, such as the preparatory work of 
the treaty, may be taken into account if an analysis under Article 31 leads to an obscure or absurd 
result.  The endorsement of these provisions by DSB bodies330 suggests that the only constraint 
faced by such bodies in deciding which law to apply is whether or not the law is relevant to the 
dispute before it.  There appears to be nothing in the DSU which contradicts this interpretation.   
The AB in US-Shrimp used these provisions to determine whether Members considered that 
exhaustible natural resources included living resources by considering a number of MEAs, such 
as UNCLOS.331  In doing so, it reconciled WTO law and non-WTO law by interpreting WTO 
law to bring it in line with MEAs dealing with the conservation of living resources.  It also 
advocated for the conclusion of MEAs in order to conserve common resources.332     
Similar findings regarding multilateral agreement were made in other WTO cases and 
documents.333  However, in EC-Biotech¸ the Panel refused to take into account MEAs such as 
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the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) when determining the WTO-consistency of the EU’s 
importation measures on GMOs.  It found that a DSB body could use international laws to 
determine the ordinary meaning of treaty terms but was not obliged to do so.334  However, the 
Panel’s reasoning on this point has been criticised by Young who argues that this leads to the 
selection of arbitrary sources of non-WTO law, rather than those relevant to the dispute.335  
Although there is no formal hierarchy of cases or rules of precedent in the WTO system, AB 
jurisprudence has made it clear that Panels are expected to follow AB reports.336  Given that US-
Shrimp is an AB case, it would likely be seen as more influential than EC-Biotech. 
This suggests that any relevant non-WTO can, and should, be used to interpret provisions of 
WTO agreements, where these are relevant to the dispute.  This accords with the institutional 
method of reconciling conflict. 
Another aspect of US-Shrimp and US-Shrimp 21.5 which gives further weight to the idea that 
any relevant non-WTO law can be used to resolve a WTO dispute, is the fact that the AB did not 
consider whether the parties in the case were also parties to the non-WTO agreements it drew on 
to interpret GATT Article XX(g).337   This suggests that, when reconciling WTO law with non-
WTO law, there is no need to determine whether the parties in the case intended to be bound by 
the non-WTO law drawn upon.  However, this is at odds with findings in Indonesia-Automobiles 
and EC-Biotech.  In Indonesia-Automobiles the Panel held that, for a conflict to exist between 
two treaties, both treaties must have the same parties.338  In EC-Biotech the Panel also found that 
for a non-WTO agreement to be relevant to a WTO dispute, all WTO Members must also be 
parties to the non-WTO agreement.339  These findings in EC-Biotech have been criticised by 
commentators however,340 and were not followed in EC-Civil Aircraft where the AB held that ‘a 
delicate balance must be struck between, on the one hand, taking due account of an individual 
WTO Member's international obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and 
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harmonious approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all WTO Members.’341  Both 
Indonesia-Automobiles and EC-Biotech were decided by Panels.  US-Shrimp and EU-Civil 
Aircraft were decided by the AB.  This suggests that future DSB bodies would give more weight 
to the findings in the latter two cases. 
Flett, considering the issue from the point of view of a WTO litigator, believes that DSB bodies 
sometimes use non-WTO agreements as context for their decisions, without explicitly 
mentioning these in their judgments,342 and that ‘the WTO is, in fact, relatively open to 
interaction with other international law regimes’343.  This is a further indication that, from a 
practical perspective, the DSB bodies use non-WTO agreements to resolve conflict even when 
certain parties to the case before them are not parties to the agreement in question.  Thus, 
reconciling WTO law with non-WTO law through interpretation, regardless of whether there is a 
potential conflict between these laws, probably best reflects the actual approach of DSB bodies 
to resolving conflicts. 
(b) The conflict presumptions 
As noted, the conflict presumptions come into play under the conventional method if it is not 
possible to reconcile agreements through interpretation.  These presumptions have only a limited 
role to play in resolving conflict using the institutional method.  However, they may be relevant 
in determining the intention of the parties to conflicting agreements under both methods.  
Presumption against conflict 
This aspect of conflict resolution is closely related to reconciliation through agreement.  The 
presumption against conflict promotes the idea that agreements should be read together, thereby 
harmonising these agreements.   
There is a strong emphasis on the prevention of conflict in the WTO.  In a number of cases, the 
DSB has held that WTO Members intended provisions of WTO agreements to be applied 
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cumulatively, except where there is a specific conflict between provisions.344  DSB bodies in fact 
appear to actively avoid conflict, as in the case of Brazil-Tyres, where the AB’s findings 
suggested that, because there was a clause in MERCOSUR, a preferential trade agreement 
(PTA), which corresponded with GATT Article XX(b) and allowed Brazil to raise human health 
issues before a MERCOSUR Tribunal, Brazil’s obligation to comply with the ruling of such 
Tribunal did not affect whether or not its measures were consistent with Article XX.345   
However, The AB in Peru-Agricultural Products pointed out that a non-WTO agreement could 
not be used to interpret WTO agreements where the former ‘subvert(s) the common intention of 
the treaty parties’.346  Where there is a direct conflict between provisions of agreements 
therefore, in that the provisions cannot co-exist, a DSB body would have to engage in a conflict 
analysis, on the strength of this finding.  This accords with the statement in the ILC Study that 
reconciliation cannot resolve cases of genuine conflict.       
Lex posterior 
The other presumptions in the ILC ‘toolbox’ to resolve conflict, namely the lex posterior, lex 
specialis and lex superior (the lex specialis and lex superior presumptions are discussed below), 
have received only limited recognition by DSB bodies.  However, they have been subject to 
analysis by commentators, none more so than the controversial lex posterior presumption.   
On the basis of the lex posterior presumption, Pauwelyn believes that MEAs, if raised as a 
defence, rather than for interpretative purposes, will override WTO rules, although this does not 
apply to ‘continuing treaties’ (the situation where A ratifies treaty X first and treaty Y second, 
and B ratifies treaty Y first and treaty X second).347  Others also take Pauwelyn’s view and this 
has been influential enough to cast doubt on the purpose of the MEA negotiations currently 
underway as part of the Doha Round.348  However, the Panel in EC-Poultry did state that past 
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panels had been cautious is applying the lex posterior presumption in interpreting Member’s 
tariff schedules and that this presumption could not override the intention of the parties.349 
With regard to Article 41, which is a specific formulation of the lex posterior presumption, no 
DSB body has specifically stated that it considers Article 41 of the VCLT to reflect international 
customary law.  However, Rigaux and Simon, in their commentary on the VCLT, are of the view 
that ‘(e)ven if no tribunal and no State has formally pronounced on the customary character of 
Article 41, constant practice resolutely points in favour of the recognition of such character.’350  
The ILC is also of the view that the VCLT reflects international customary law.351  The DSB 
bodies too have referred to more than twenty other provisions of the VCLT in various 
judgments352 and, in addition to findings by DSB bodies on the customary nature of Articles 31 
and 32, the Panel in EC-Poultry found that Articles 30(3) and 59(1) of the VCLT represent a 
codification of customary international law.353  This shows that DSB bodies do recognise 
provisions of the VCLT other than Articles 31 and 32 to reflect international customary law. 
The ILC points out that there is nothing in the text of the WTO agreements suggesting that 
Members cannot conclude inter se agreements modifying their rights and obligations in line with 
Article 41, provided that the inter se agreement restricts trade amongst the parties or does not 
contravene rules in the original agreement, and the agreement is notified to other Members.354  
Pauwelyn also believes that inter se agreements are acceptable in the WTO, because suspension 
of concessions against one party is an acceptable form of retaliation in the WTO, and the 
majority of WTO obligations must, therefore, be bilateral rather than multilateral or erga omnes 
agreements.355   
Vranes too holds the view that WTO treaties may be modified inter se, provided that such 
modification does not prejudice the rights of third parties and the other requirements of Article 
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41 are met.356  Writing in 2008, Vranes points to a number of cases which contain indications 
that the DSB bodies would be willing to consider arguments that raised non-WTO law as a 
defence to non-compliance with a WTO provision.357  Vranes also acknowledged, however, that 
in several cases DSB bodies took ‘distinctly restrictive stances’ of the role international law can 
play in WTO proceedings’.358  Vranes therefore concluded that there was no explicit signal either 
way in the case law359 but ultimately decided, on the basis of academic writing, that there is no 
indication in the WTO Agreements that WTO Members intended to prevent the modification of 
WTO provisions inter se.360 
Trachtman takes the opposite view.  He argues on the basis of Articles 3:2, 7 and 11 of the DSU 
that WTO Members intended that DSB bodies would only apply WTO law, a stance which he 
believes was confirmed by the AB in the cases of EC-Poultry and Argentina-Footwear.361  
However, he appears to be in the minority with this view362 and himself admits that ‘(w)hile 
present WTO law seems clearly to exclude direct application of non-WTO international law, this 
position seems unsustainable as increasing conflicts between trade values and non-trade values 
arise.’363   
The AB dealt briefly with Article 41 in Peru-Agricultural Products.  Peru raised Article 41 in an 
attempt to justify its ‘Price Range System’ for the calculation of duties on certain agricultural 
products, which contravened both Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Peru’s 
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Schedule of Concessions.364  Peru had argued before the Panel that a PTA concluded between 
Guatemala and Peru, in which Guatemala had apparently waived its right to challenge the Price 
Range System, precluded Guatemala from bringing proceedings in the WTO challenging this 
system.365  However, the AB found that the WTO agreements contain specific provisions dealing 
with amendments, waivers and exceptions for PTAs366 ‘which prevail over the general 
provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as Article 41’.367    
Prima facie the AB did not appear to limit its findings on Article 41 to PTAs.  A wider 
application is suggested by the mention of waivers, which can also allow unilateral conduct.  If 
so, the finding is dubious at best, given the recognition by DSB bodies of the international 
customary character of many provisions of the VCLT, and the views expressed by commentators 
that Article 41 reflects international customary law.  However, the vast number of PTAs which 
have been negotiated in recent years, including the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
representing a third of all trade,368 do appear to constitute a threat to the multilateral trading 
system.369  Countries frustrated with the Doha Round have turned to PTAs to facilitate their trade 
goals, and the attention of trade ministers has also turned in this direction.370  Because of this, it 
is clear that the WTO struggles with its role in cases involving PTAs371 and its ultimate refusal to 
allow Peru and Guatemala’s PTA to modify WTO provisions was possibly for reasons which 
involve its perceived role as the multilateral trading body under which PTAs are allowed only as 
an exception subject to strict conditions.   
A DSB body may, therefore, not apply this restrictive reasoning to the case of a conflict between 
an MEA and a WTO agreement, especially after cases like US-Shrimp and US-Gasoline, where 
the AB stated that ‘the General Agreement (GATT) is not to be read in clinical isolation from 
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public international law’.372  On the other hand, Article XIV specifically provides that PTAs are 
an exception to compliance with GATT obligations.373  If not even PTAs can trump WTO 
obligations in the event of a conflict there appears to be little hope for any other agreement 
outside the WTO.  A Panel may also feel bound to follow the AB reasoning regarding Article 41 
in Peru-Agricultural Products.  Indeed, not doing so would seem to undermine security and 
predictability in the multilateral trading system.374  The reasoning in Peru-Agricultural Products 
therefore suggests that the use of Article 41 to justify inter se agreements modifying WTO 
provisions is not approved of by DSB bodies and that internal WTO negotiation should be used 
to modify WTO provisions. 
Lex specialis 
DSB bodies have not dealt with the lex specialis presumption as it applies in a conflict between 
WTO and non-WTO law, but only between WTO laws.  The ILC has stated that the presumption 
appears to only have a limited role in conflict resolution in the WTO.375  However, this view is 
based on the cases of Indonesia-Automobiles and Turkey-Textiles which advocate a narrow view 
of conflict.376  These cases also endorse the presumption against conflict.377  The ILC’s reasoning 
therefore appears to conflate the lex specialis presumption with the presumption against conflict.   
Rather, DSB bodies do not discount the fact that the lex specialis presumption may apply where 
a conflict does exist.  Rather, a number of WTO cases have pointed to Annex 1A of the 
Marrakesh Agreement378 as the relevant provision to apply when there is a conflict between 
WTO provisions.379  The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A provides that where there is a 
conflict between the GATT and another Annex 1A Agreement, such as the TBT and SPS, the 
Annex 1A Agreement prevails to the extent of the conflict.380  In turn, pursuant to Article 1(5) of 
the TBT, the SPS takes precedence over the TBT in the event that a measure is one that falls 
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under Annex A of the SPS.381  However, this reasoning is based on specific WTO provisions and 
does not give much insight into whether a DSB body would apply this principle to reconcile 
WTO law and non-WTO law.   
Lex superior 
Young takes the view that in the context of trade and environment, particularly fisheries 
obligations, there does not appear to be any obvious hierarchy between norms.382  Indeed, the 
DSB bodies do not appear to have used this concept in the past to resolve disputes.   
Pauwelyn too has argued that the idea advanced by commentators like Delbrück that some 
MEAs, including UNFSA, create erga omnes obligations or are binding on third parties because 
they are in the ‘public interest’, cannot be correct.383  This, according to Pauwelyn, would violate 
the pacta tertiis principle and import an unacceptable level of subjectivity into international law 
(i.e. who decides what is in the public interest?)384  It is therefore doubtful that an MEA like 
UNFSA can be considered a lex superior for the purposes of resolving conflict. 
(c) Consultation with IGOs and NGOs 
As discussed, the institutional method advocates that DSB bodies consult with IGOs and NGOs 
and accept and use amicus briefs and reports from these bodies.  This allows DSB bodies to 
understand the relevance of the laws, rather than attempting to discern this from international 
agreements.   
However, as Young points out, DSB bodies have been reluctant to consult with IGOs in the past, 
and have done so in only a limited number of cases.385  In addition, while the AB in US-Shrimp 
decided that Panels could accept amicus briefs,386 DSB bodies rarely rely on these in their 
reasoning,387 a practice which Perez has termed ‘incorporate but ignore’.388  It is possible, as 
Flett suggests, that DSB bodies take these briefs into account without actually mentioning them 
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in their judgments.  As there is no clear evidence of this however, not possible to determine 
when or if the AB will use these briefs. 
D. Application to the herring dispute 
As the above analysis has shown, DSB bodies are reluctant to apply conflict presumptions to the 
cases before them, and prefer to reconcile agreements through interpretation.  To the extent that 
this is not possible however, other conflict presumptions or methods will need to be employed to 
resolve disputes.   
In analysing the various agreements in issue in the herring case, it should be noted that the 
Faroes, while it can become a party to a treaty or organisation in its own right, and has done so in 
the case of NEAFC, was not a WTO Member or an UNCLOS party at the time of the dispute.  
Rather, the disputes at the WTO and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an UNCLOS 
tribunal, were ‘lodged on its behalf’ by Denmark.389  Both UNCLOS and the WTO accepted this 
by taking the cases, at least provisionally.  Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, it will be 
accepted that the Faroes is a party to all agreements to which Denmark is a party. 
(i) Reconciliation through interpretation 
As discussed, DSB bodies appear to allow the use of all relevant international law to interpret 
WTO agreements, in line with the institutional method.  In the herring dispute, this would 
include all those agreements allowing PSMs to be taken against those states engaged in IUU 
fishing, particularly those which specifically regulate IUU fishing of herring, such as the NEAFC 
Scheme.   
The AB in US-Shrimp found that, in the circumstances of the case before it, the US had an 
obligation to enter into multilateral negotiations with countries to preserve sea turtles.390  As 
discussed in Chapter III, the Chapeau would likely have been interpreted in a similar manner had 
the herring dispute gone before a Panel, based both on the AB’s reasoning and the fact that there 
are a number of MEAs in international law which advocate multilateral cooperation to conserve 
fish stocks, including UNCLOS, UNFSA, the PSMA and others.391  This suggests that 
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cooperation is particularly important in conserving fish stocks.  In using these agreements to 
interpret the Chapeau, a Panel would reconcile WTO law and non-WTO law, thereby creating 
greater harmonisation between trade and fisheries law.   
A number of the MEAs under discussion could have been used as evidence of such multilateral 
cooperation amongst the parties.  As the EU and Faroes agreed to regulate the conservation of 
fish stocks through these MEAs, it is also arguable that they agreed to all measures taken by the 
other party to conserve the fish stocks, provided these are allowed by the MEAs.  This would 
include the use of PSMs.  In determining evidence of multilateral cooperation however, only 
those MEAs to which the EU and Faroes (or Denmark) are parties would be relevant as only 
these can show that the parties cooperated to resolve the dispute.   
Article 23 of UNFSA allows, and may even require, states to restrict access to their ports for the 
purpose of landing and transhipping fish, where vessels have not complied with fisheries 
conservation and management measures of regional bodies.  However, these provisions are very 
general, and do not cover the specific fish in dispute.  They also do not specifically allow for 
PSMs to be used.  Thus, the very general nature of Article 23 may make the use of this provision 
as evidence of agreement to conserve herring stocks through the use of PSMs somewhat strained, 
especially because of the failure by the parties to cooperate on the specific issue of the allocation 
key for herring.392   
PSMA Articles 9(4) and 11 require states to close their ports to vessels involved in IUU fishing.  
Although also not dealing specifically with herring, the PSMA is more specific than UNFSA, as 
it expressly obliges states to use PSMs to prevent IUU fishing.  However, if we are looking for 
evidence of multilateral cooperation, it appears that the PSMA would not be relevant, as neither 
the Faroes nor Denmark is a party to this agreement. 
Article 23(4) of the NEAFC Scheme requires that PSMs be imposed on NEAFC contracting 
parties for non-compliance with NEAFC agreements.  This shows the clear intention of the 
NEAFC parties to regulate their own agreements to conserve and manage stocks in the NEAFC 
Convention Area, including herring, through the imposition of PSMs like those contained in the 
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Shared Stocks Regulation.  However, this provision was inserted into the NEAFC Scheme only 
in 2015 and would not have been applicable in the herring dispute.   
The FAO Fisheries Code, while not binding, was adopted unanimously by the FAO,393 of which 
both the EU and Denmark are Members.394 The IPOA-IUU has also been widely accepted by 
states and RFMOs395 and was used as a basis for the NEAFC Scheme.  These instruments 
therefore provide some evidence that the EU and Faroes approve of the use of PSMs to prevent 
IUU fishing. 
UNFSA, the FAO Fisheries Code and the IPOA-IUU may cumulatively provide enough 
evidence of cooperation to show that there was agreement between the EU and Faroes on how to 
best conserve the herring stock, including using PSMs to prevent IUU fishing of the stock.   
The above analysis suggests that MEAs advocating PSMs to combat IUU fishing could be used 
as evidence of multilateral cooperation under the GATT, thereby avoiding conflict between the 
GATT and these instruments.  However, at the time of the herring dispute, there was no 
provision in NEAFC specifically requiring NEAFC states to impose PSMs on their NEAFC 
trading partners for IUU fishing in the Convention Area.  The PSMA, which allows for PSMs to 
conserve fish stocks also cannot be used as evidence of multilateral cooperation.  This may mean 
that the remaining provisions are too general to provide sufficient evidence of cooperation 
between the EU and Faroes to regulate their relationship with regard to the herring stock.  In this 
case there would be a conflict between the GATT and these MEAs.  Using these agreements as 
evidence of multilateral cooperation also does not address the problem that the EU Regulations 
may be inconsistent with the Chapeau because the measures are protectionist. 
(ii) Conflict presumptions 
In applying the conflict presumptions, only those agreements to which the EU and Faroes (or 
Denmark) are parties are relevant to the analysis, as these presumptions are used to resolve actual 
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conflict between agreements.  The ILC Study also did not deal with soft law, and it would seem 
that the FAO Fisheries Code and IPOA-IUU should not be part of a conventional conflict 
analysis, despite providing evidence of the intention of the parties to the dispute.  This means 
that, in applying the conflict presumptions, only UNFSA is potentially in conflict with the 
GATT. 
UNFSA was entered into by the parties later in time than the GATT.396  It is, therefore, the lex 
posterior and, on Pauwelyn’s view, would trump the GATT in a conflict.  UNFSA could also 
potentially be considered an inter se agreement between the parties modifying the GATT, under 
Article 41.  However, given the findings in the case of Peru-Agricultural Products rejecting the 
application of Article 41 in WTO disputes, a Panel may not be willing to accept an inter se 
modification of a WTO agreement, despite the fact that the majority of commentators believe 
that WTO law would allow such modification.   
As mentioned in part B(i) however, the ILC is of the view that conflict clauses dealing with the 
status of later or earlier agreements should be included in a new agreement, in order to resolve 
problems in applying the lex posterior presumption.  Although the GATT does not appear to 
have a conflict clause, UNFSA does have such a clause.397   
Article 31(1) of UNFSA provides that the rights and duties of parties to UNFSA arising from 
other agreements to which these states are already parties are not affected by the coming into 
operation of UNFSA, provided these rights and duties are not incompatible with UNFSA.  Under 
this clause UNFSA takes precedence over prior concluded agreements between state parties, 
where there is a conflict of norms between UNFSA and these prior agreements.  The GATT was 
initially concluded in 1947 and revised in 1994 when the WTO was created.  UNFSA was 
concluded only in 1995.  UNFSA was therefore concluded later in time than the GATT.  This 
suggests that, if the Panel did engage in a conflict analysis in the herring dispute, there would be 
clear evidence from the UNFSA conflict clause that the intention of the parties to both UNFSA 
and the GATT is that a provision in UNFSA would override a provision in the GATT.  Whether 
a DSB body would take this into account is unclear.  Although Pauwelyn believes that it would, 
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WTO jurisprudence has, in fact, indicated that DSB bodies are cautious in applying the lex 
posterior presumption.     
In the management of straddling fish stocks, and particularly herring, it certainly seems that 
UNFSA is also the lex specialis.  However, the fact that the EU used trade measures to enforce 
these agreements may potentially make the GATT the more specialised law.  The problems 
evident in resolving conflict through this sort of analysis are the reason that conflict rules like the 
lex specialis presumption may be inappropriate for resolving trade and environment disputes.  As 
discussed, there is also no indication in the case law as to whether a DSB body would apply this 
presumption to resolve a dispute between WTO and non-WTO law.   
(iii) The institutional method 
If the institutional method was used by a Panel to resolve the herring conflict, it would take into 
account the expressions of state intent arising from the analysis of conflict presumptions above, 
as well as the potential for reconciliation of agreements.  However, it would also consider the 
findings of IGOs like FAO and ICES regarding the devastating impact of IUU fishing, the 
necessity of PSMs to prevent IUU fishing and the need for the protection of the herring stock.398  
In determining whether the findings of ICES and the FAO are relevant, it should be noted that 
the majority of ICES member states are from Europe and include the NEAFC parties.  ICES also 
consults a network of over 4000 scientists from many different countries, in conducting its 
research.399  It aims to be transparent in the projects it takes on, providing information not only 
on the project itself, but also on which states or organisations are funding the project.400  The 
FAO has an extremely wide membership, made up of both developed and developing 
countries401 and is transparent about its processes.402  It is also a highly respected international 
organisation.403  
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However, the reluctance of DSB bodies to consult with IGOs may have led a Panel to overlook 
findings by these bodies in the herring dispute.   
(iv) Conclusion 
It is possible that reconciliation of MEAs and the GATT could occur in the herring dispute 
although this may not be possible.  However, application of the conflict presumptions and 
institutional method suggest that PSMs to prevent IUU fishing in domestic legislation of WTO 
Members should be recognised by DSB bodies as GATT-consistent.  If a Panel had engaged in a 
conflict analysis in the herring dispute, it may very well have found for the EU.   
The most progressive approach by DSB bodies to conflict resolution to date has been that of the 
AB in the US-Shrimp dispute.  However, there appeared to be no direct conflict between the non-
WTO agreements relied on by the AB and the GATT in US-Shrimp, and no defence based on 
these agreements was raised by the parties.  In contrast, DSB bodies faced with direct conflict404 
have shied away from any sort of conflict analysis.  This suggests that a Panel faced with the 
herring dispute would not have engaged in a direct conflict analysis and would not have allowed 
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Chapter IX – Conclusion 
The herring dispute raises a number of interesting questions regarding the relationship between 
trade and fisheries in international law.  The growing number of agreements and soft law 
instruments attempting to prevent IUU fishing and thereby alleviate some of the pressure on a 
diminishing resource, illustrate the importance of this issue to the international community.  
However, there are other areas of international law, such as trade, which also regulate important 
issues, including the alleviation of poverty through economic growth.  This inevitably leads to 
conflict, but it need not necessarily lead to fragmentation of international law.  It is important 
that international tribunals find ways to reconcile these provisions and to confront conflicts 
directly, rather than ignoring them.   
We have seen in Chapters II and III that the EU Regulations, while well-crafted, may still be 
GATT-inconsistent in the circumstances of the herring dispute, at least on an application of 
principles enumerated in WTO jurisprudence.  The provisions may be discriminatory on their 
face, as they treat the Faroes differently to other NEAFC parties importing herring and mackerel 
into the EU.  They also prevent freedom of transit through the EU and transhipment in EU ports.  
The EU Regulations do appear to be provisionally justified under Article XX(g) of the GATT.  
However, they may contravene the Article XX Chapeau because of the way they are applied.  In 
this regard, the EU did not appear to effectively consult with the Faroes prior to imposing the EU 
Regulations.  The EU may also be discriminating against third party states by providing 
subsidies to its own states, and thereby building up the capacity of its own fishing fleets.  This 
increases the potential for IUU fishing by its own fleets while it simultaneously attempts to 
prevent IUU fishing in the waters of third party states. 
However, there are a number of MEAs that allow the types of PSMs taken in the EU 
Regulations.  The MEAs conflict with GATT Articles V, and possibly I and XI.  Chapter IV 
considered whether these MEAs could be reconciled with the GATT through interpretation and, 
if not, whether methods developed for resolving conflict in international law could be used to 
resolve conflict between these agreements.  This analysis suggested that MEAs could possibly be 
reconciled with the GATT by providing evidence of multilateral cooperation between the parties, 
as required by the Article XX Chapeau.  However, this would still not render the EU Regulations 
GATT-consistent if they were found to be protectionist. 
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A conflict analysis was then conducted.  The analysis suggested that the PSMs imposed by the 
EU Regulations should be allowed by a Panel hearing the herring dispute.  This is because the 
intent of the parties to the GATT and the MEAs analysed, particularly UNFSA, appears to be 
that WTO Members should be allowed to use PSMs to prevent IUU fishing.  This is bolstered by 
the fact that IUU fishing poses a significant threat to a valuable resource, upsets attempts to 
sustainably manage fish stocks and is linked to a number of other crimes, such as drug 
trafficking, arms trafficking and human trafficking.  However, an analysis of the practice of DSB 
bodies showed that DSB bodies are wary of applying conflict presumptions such as the lex 
posterior and lex specialis and generally engaging in outright conflict analysis. 
Thus, should a DSB body be faced with the Shared Stocks Regulation and a specific 
implementing regulation in a case where a WTO Member applies measures against an RFMO 
partner, it would likely find such regulations to be inconsistent with the GATT and not justifiable 
with reference to a conflict analysis.  This suggests that measures taken against RMFO partners 
to prevent IUU fishing are not reconcilable with international trade law unless they are found to 
be GATT-consistent, and raising MEAs as a defence to a GATT contravention is unlikely to 
assist WTO Members.  It would therefore be prudent for WTO Members applying these sorts of 
measures against RFMO partners, including the EU, to address the problems identified in the 
analysis of the EU Regulations set out in Chapter III. 
To this end, a WTO Member should ensure that it engages properly with an RFMO partner with 
which it has a dispute before imposing unilateral measures against such partner.  This would 
require best efforts to come to an agreement.  It should also ensure that it defines important 
concepts in its measures as clearly as possible, to avoid findings of arbitrary discrimination.  
Finally, it should focus on preventing IUU fishing of its own nationals to the same extent as it 
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